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Chapter 1: National Narratives & Nostalgia, Entwined
Our past, on the contrary, is that which acts no longer but which might act, and will act by
inserting itself into a present sensation of which it borrows the vitality.
—Henri Bergson

While a nation’s past may not act in the present, it certainly lives in it. The narrative that
the people of a nation come to embody and protect, though influenced by its past, comes about
through how generations recollect and carry forth this shared history. National narratives are,
inherently, stories—albeit fact-based stories—but stories, nonetheless. Melancholy accounts of
history carry through generations, and their emotional appeal increases a people’s tendency to
safeguard the narrative. While the internalization of many historic events influences a nation's
narrative, I will argue that those of occupation, war, and outcomes of economic development—
positive or negative—have the most profound effect. This protected, and often tailored, narrative
touches all aspects of a nation’s identity and their presentation and perception on the global
stage.
Bulgaria demonstrates particularly well history’s effect on a nation’s narrative.
Unfortunate negative historic circumstances following occupation, war, and poor economic
development have inculcated a cynical and pessimistic historic internalization amongst the
Bulgarian people that only persists and intensifies with time. The first significant event followed
the apogee of the Second Bulgarian Empire in the 13th century, when the Ottoman Empire
subjugated the nation, resulting in a 500-year long occupation.1 The freedom, territory, and

Crampton, R. J., ed. “MEDIAEVAL BULGARIA, 681–1393.” In A Concise History of Bulgaria, 2nd ed., 9–28.
Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511996870.006.
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economic superiority lost during the Turkish Occupation was the catalyst for a perpetually
worsening national narrative. When the Russian Empire liberated the Bulgarians from the
Ottomans after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, independence gave the Bulgarian people
but a mere glimpse of hope.2 A tumultuous warring period followed the creation of the Bulgarian
state in 1878 with the Balkan Wars from 1912-1913, World War I in 1914, and World War II in
1939. Losses suffered through the Balkan Wars and alliances with Germany in both World Wars
furthered a dreary Bulgarian narrative. The most recent in Bulgaria’s series of unfortunate events
to influence the shift to a bleak national narrative was the nearly forty-five yearlong Communist
regime and Bulgaria’s poor transition to capitalism following its fall. Highlighting the events that
led to a Bulgarian narrative grim with negative internalizations of history plays a pivotal role in
understanding the narrative’s evolution. The jarring geographic transformation from the Second
Bulgarian Empire (Fig. 1) to Bulgaria today (Fig. 2) stresses the unique power Bulgaria once had
and its inability to regain it. As Bulgaria’s geographical reach diminished, so did the hope among
the Bulgarian people, and thus, the positivity within the national narrative.
While specific historical events influence the Bulgarian narrative, one must look at the
entirety of Bulgarian history to truly understand the internalization of such a negative narrative.
The Ottoman Occupation gave rise to two sentiments that both contribute to the negative
narrative: The “Turkish yoke” and the practice of oplakvane. Though these will be discussed
meticulously in Chapter Two, I will briefly cover their definition and their effect on the
narrative. The Turkish yoke is an ideology within the Bulgarian collective imagination that

Neuburger, Mary. “The Bulgarian Figure in the Ottoman Carpet: Untangling Nation from Empire.” In The Orient
Within, 33. Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria. Cornell University Press,
2004. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvrf89ms.7.
2
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Figure 1: The Second Bulgarian
Empire (UNDP.BG)

perceives Western rejection and
Bulgaria’s backwardness as a result
of Ottoman Turkish barbarism, and
asserts that the Bulgarians “saved”
Europe from a similar fate.3 While
centering itself on resentment
towards the Turks, the yoke is also
resentful and jealous of the West for
their unwillingness to assist the
Bulgarian people during the
Occupation and the benefits this
selfish nature had on the West’s

Figure 2: Bulgaria,
Today (Library of
Congress)

own economic and cultural
development. In short, the yoke
places feelings of self-importance
alongside indignation within the
Bulgarian narrative. Furthermore, the
practice of oplakvane (complaining)
grew out of frustration towards
Bulgarian complacency during the
Occupation and lack of recognition
from the global community. These
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Occupation-born sentiments transformed the Bulgarian narrative into harboring constant
dissatisfaction towards the national condition. As Bulgaria entered a series of wars in the early
Twentieth Century, the country faced betrayal from Balkan neighbors, territorial losses, and
worsened at-home conditions. Essentially, bad alliances and poor decision making at key
moments diminished hope for Bulgarian success during this period—this will be further
discussed in Chapter Two. During this time, not only did oplakvane become quotidian, but mere
tones of dissatisfaction within the national narrative escalated into heightened hopelessness of
ever regaining satisfaction. Not only were the people unhappy, but unhappiness became habitual.
The greatness of the culturally and ethnically homogenous Second Bulgarian Empire remained a
distant memory and any prospects of its restoration quickly became unattainable fantasies. While
previous periods lamented betrayal from the West and Balkan neighbors, the country’s
experience and transition from the forty-five yearlong Bulgarian Communist regime—fervent
with corruption, economic turmoil, and polarization of the elite and middle class—signaled
deception within its people. Thus, the national narrative only grew more negative as the
transition cemented feelings of hopelessness and cultivated sentiments of a ‘Bulgarian curse’ of
perpetual backwardness. The Bulgarian narrative’s negative trajectory progressed with time,
beginning as a dissatisfaction towards the present, transitioning into a disheartenment towards
improvement, and, ultimately, propagating the belief of a cursed backwardness.
In interviews conducted by communication psychologist Nadezhda Sotirova to study the
Bulgarian narrative, interviewees expressed the present-day belief of the ‘Bulgarian curse.’ All
interviewees held sentiments with the following tone: “Run, run away, and don’t come back.
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Watch your life. Your parents will be fine. You go to a normal country—and don’t look back.”4
These present accounts, as this thesis will show, exhibit how the Bulgarian narrative began as a
mere dissatisfaction, evolved into a loss of hope, and culminated into the current ‘Bulgarian
curse’ motivating many Bulgarians to flee the nation. Unfortunately, as Chapter Four will
illustrate, the Bulgarian narrative continues to worsen in the present day—and this begs the
question, why?
From the birth of oplakvane and the Turkish Yoke, the Bulgarian narrative displayed
tones that made its beliefs a breeding ground for nostalgia. However, as the circumstances of
various wars and Bulgaria’s transition from communism further infiltrated the Bulgarian
narrative, Bulgaria’s nostalgia only increased and grew political in nature. The internalization of
nostalgia in a political context and use of nostalgia as a political weapon poses massive threats to
development. So large, that political nostalgia, which has only increased through a defeatist
national narrative, has caused Bulgaria’s stagnation. This chapter will primarily define nostalgia,
frame it within a political context, and conclude by discussing its dangers in a political context.
After establishing this foundation, Chapter Two will address the impetus of nostalgia as a result
of the worsening national narrative following the Ottoman Occupation, The Balkan Wars, and
World War I. Chapter Three will address the rise of political nostalgia as a result of the national
narrative transgressing from pessimistic to hopeless due to the reign of the Bulgarian Communist
regime and Bulgaria’s transition to a democracy. Ultimately, Chapter Four will highlight how the
dangers of political nostalgia manifest themselves in Bulgaria today, due to a national narrative
purporting the Bulgarian curse of perpetual backwardness and the use of nostalgia to spur

Sotirova, Nadezhda. “The ‘Bulgarian Situation’: Constructing the Myth of a ‘national Mentality’ in Bulgarian
Discourse and Its Effect on Agency.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 6 (December 2018): 564.
http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1493857.
4
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populist political parties. Bulgaria remains overshadowed by its distant greatness, fueling a bleak
national narrative fervent with dangerous political nostalgia that magnifies with time, stagnating
the nation’s ability to ever progress.
The Literature of Political Nostalgia
Nostalgia arises from two Greek roots: Nostos (“return home”) and algos (“pain”).5 The
positive relationship between the Bulgarian narrative’s negativity and the greatness of Bulgaria’s
past embodies these roots; as the people’s internalization of the pain under present conditions
increased, so did the desire to return to an exaggerated historic greatness. In order to prove that
political nostalgia thrives in Bulgaria, I will first explore literature regarding the presence of
political nostalgia in other nations.
Daphne Berdahl, an anthropologist noted for her work on gender, consumption, and postcommunist nostalgia, discusses the social conditions that gave rise to Ostalgie—or eastern
German nostalgia— in the former German Democratic Republic and the subsequent birth and
boom of a nostalgia industry in former East Germany in “‘(N)Ostalgie’ for the Present: Memory,
Longing, and East German Things.” Berdahl relies on earlier literature of Kathleen Stewart6 in
“Nostalgia—A Polemic” and Andreas Huyssen’s7 “Nostalgia for Ruins” to create her own
definition of ostalgie. Berdahl details behaviors of East Germans (Ossis) to support Stewart’s
claim that nostalgia for the GDR posits a ‘once was’ relation to a ‘now’, “nostalgia is about the

5 “Nostalgia Noun - Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary at
OxfordLearnersDictionaries.Com.” Accessed April 11, 2021.
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/nostalgia?q=nostalgia.
6
Stewart is currently a professor at the University of Texas in Austin, writing and teaching on affect, experimental
ethnographic writing, non-representational theory, post-phenomenology
7
Huyssen is a Villard Professor Emeritus of German and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, a
founding director of the University’s Center for Comparative Literature and Society, and a founding editor of the
New German Critique
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production of a present rather than the reproduction of a past.”8 Berdahl then borrows from
Huyssen to show that Ossi societal behavior also shows an attempt to reclaim a romanticized and
hazily glorified homeland.9 Essentially, Berdahl uses the precondition of dissatisfaction with the
present to glorify a past homeland, thus developing nostalgia. Berdahl credits unemployment in
post reunification East Germany, the reminiscence of the GDR state’s supplantation of the
private sphere, and the relegation of East German products as factors which undermined the Ossi
identity and personhood. Thus, igniting a discontent with the present and spurring a thriving
nostalgia industry.
Post reunification, Eastern Germany experienced a surge in unemployment. For Ossis
who were “all raised to be socialists, and we were taught that work is what separates humans
from animals…to be without work [was] unthinkable.”10 The recantation of one’s identity as a
producer through unemployment ignited the romanticization and glorification of the GDR
homeland Huyssen highlights. Furthermore, the socialist GDR supplanted functions of the
private sphere through social welfare. Notably, GDR factories typically housed a day care center,
a general store, and a doctor’s office for its workers.11 While a post-reunification identity crisis
led to glorification of the GDR, the German state’s separation from the private sphere following
the transition led Ossis to hope for a present in which social welfare was again prioritized.
Ultimately, the devaluation and ridicule of East German products by West Germany further
eroded Ossi identity, strengthening the romanticization of the GDR and the prescriptive nature of
nostalgia. While Berdahl presents many examples of such relegation, that of the Trabant best

Berdahl, Daphne. “‘(N)Ostalgie’ for the Present: Memory, Longing, and East German Things.” Ethnos 64, no. 2
(January 1, 1999): 202. https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.1999.9981598.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., 199.
11
Ibid.,194.
8
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depicts the impairing effect on the Ossi identity. The Trabant provoked a sense of
accomplishment and affinity among Ossis, as they typically waited on a 15-year long waitlist and
spent two annual salaries to purchase the vehicle.12 Yet, when West Germans placed Trabants in
storage warehouses and waste dumps, the vehicle became a symbol of backwardness, social
inefficiency, and inferiority. Though the socialist past was not very free or prosperous, there was
a sense of belonging among Ossis that provided them structure and comfort, making them crave
this period both rationally and irrationally. The hostility towards and satirization of Ossi culture
by the West further insinuated an undermining of Ossi identity. With such neglect toward Ossi
identity post reunification, ostalgie flourished through the revival and consumption of GDR
products in attempts for identity retrieval.
In essays adapted from her novel The Future of Nostalgia, Svetlana Boym, Slavic
Languages and Literatures and of Comparative Literature at Harvard University, relates
nostalgia’s fruition to a dislocation in space and a changing concept of time.13 Boym defines
nostalgia as “a longing for a home that no longer exists or has existed… a sentiment of loss and
displacement, but it is also a romance with one's own fantasy.”14 She ascribes the phenomena to
three defining qualities: contemporary roots, arising as a result of new understandings of time
and longing15; covetousness towards a specific and internalized past16; and a retrospective and
prospective nature.17 In short, nostalgia is modern, subjective, and prescriptive. To Boym,
political nostalgia arises when the subjective visions of an imagined reality colonize politics,
history, and everyday perceptions. This initial colonization and birth of political nostalgia

12

Ibid., 195.
Boym, Svetlana. “Nostalgia and Its Discontents.” Hedgehog Review 9, no. 2 (2007): 12.
14
Ibid., 7.
15
Ibid., 8.
16
Ibid., 8.
17
Ibid., 8.
13
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occurred during the Enlightenment and, contemporarily, can best be seen through the popularity
of the film Good Bye, Lenin! in post reunification Germany.18
The Enlightenment connected a feeling of longing with a romantic nationalism.
Intellectuals and poets during this time began claiming “they had a special word for home
sickness that was radically untranslatable,”19 depicting the subjective nature of the phenomena.
Although the Portuguese utilized saudade, the Russians toska, the Czech litost, the Romanians
dor, the Germans heimweh, and the Spanish mal de corazon, the untranslatable words held a
uniform grammar of romantic nostalgia: “I long, therefore I am.”20 The popularity of Good bye,
Lenin! shows how such a longing transcended into an everyday perception and created societal
divides in post reunification Germany. In the 2003 film, a mother, who was an East German true
believer, experienced an accident inducing her into a coma during the fall of the Berlin Wall.21
Upon awakening, her children preserve her nostalgic illusion of the GDR through censorship of
television reports and usage of East German products within their household.22 Though initially
perceived as having a mimetic nature of Ossis, the Ossi’s warm reception of the film led the film
to have a deeper societal impact. East Germans relished in their ability to preserve their nostalgic
differences.23 Good Bye, Lenin provided nostalgia a contemporary status, allowed Ossis to
romanticize specific aspects of their GDR past, and ignited hope for this romanticized past to
exist in the present due to the film’s positive reception and popularity.
Ultimately, Dr. Mitja Velikonja, a Religious Studies scholar at the University of
Ljubliana, Slovenia, focused on post-socialist nations to craft a definition of particularly socialist

18

Ibid., 12-18.
Ibid., 12-13.
20
Ibid.,12-13.
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Ibid., 17.
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political nostalgia in “Lost in Transition: Nostalgia for Socialism in Post-Socialist Countries.”
Velikonja defines nostalgia as a “a complex, differentiated, changing, emotionladen, personal or
collective, (non)instrumentalized story that binarily laments and glorifies a romanticized lost
time, people, objects, feelings, scents, events, spaces, relationships, values, political and other
systems, all of which stand in sharp contrast to the inferior present.”24 Similarly to Berdahl’s
definition, Velikonja’s nostalgia is based on a discontent with the present. A unique aspect of
Velikonja’s theory asserts that the glorification of the past is rooted in a belief that the people
both do not want to and know they cannot return to it.25 Velikonja attributes the rise of political
nostalgia to a series of events that occurred as a result of the transition out of socialism for
Socialist states: the demolition of the welfare state, capitalism, rise of social injustices,
repatriarchalization, retraditionalization, clericalization, and nationalist conflicts.26 He explores
venerations of socialism in public places, consumption of socialist consumer goods and
commercial brands, and public survey opinion polls to demonstrate his main claim regarding
nostalgia: nostalgia is rooted in the present, not the past. While Velikonja refers to events in
Russia, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia to support
his definition, the case of Slovenia is most pronounced in covering all aspects of his definition.
Following the fall of communism and the subsequent dissolution of Yugoslavia, the
Federal Republic of Slovenia aptly displayed Velikonja’s political nostalgia. Public
commemorations of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
public opinion polls favoring socialism over capitalism contrasted against public opinions polls
showing no desire to a return to communism. The Slovenia case supports Velikonja’s claim that

Velikonja, Mitja. “Lost in Transition: Nostalgia for Socialism in Post-Socialist Countries.” East European Politics
and Societies, October 2, 2009, 538. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325409345140.
25
Ibid., 546.
26
Ibid., 537.
24
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though political nostalgia glorifies romanticized periods and people, individuals flirt with
nostalgia because they are sure it will not return. A historic exhibition in Belgrade titled Efekat
Tito (The Tito Effect) drew individuals from all six ex-Yugoslav republics to commemorate his
leadership.27 Furthermore, the controversial leader of the Slovene National party, Zmago
Jelinčič, utilized praise for Tito as a way to generate support and credibly through calling him
‘the son of a Slovenian mother’, ‘leader of the partisans’, ‘Marshal of Yugoslavia’, and erecting
a monument to Tito in his private backyard—as public opinion polls showed 90% of Slovenians
considered him a positive historical personally.28 Such public events and the incorporation of
Tito into political platforms exhibits nostalgia for the socialist Yugoslavia glorified through the
people and political systems of it’s past. Furthermore, results of public opinion polls depicted
how the public also glorified the values, relationships, and daily livelihood of the Socialist
period. In 1995, 1998, and 2003, 88.1%, 88.2% and 86.1% of the Slovenian population described
their life in Yugoslavia as either “good” or “very good”29 and a public opinion poll cast through
televoting during a TV show in Slovenia in 2009 concluded that 60% of the population preferred
socialism while only 40% preferred capitalism when asked “In what political system is life
better?”30 Oddly enough, though, a 2001 public opinion poll concluded that 68.1% of the
population “strongly disagreed” when responding to the statement that “we should return to the
rule of the communists.”31 These results can only be explained through Velikonja’s assertation
that the people are reminiscent because they are sure this regime will never truly return. Put
simply, it is easier to glorify something you know will never occur again—the grass is always

27
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greener. The people do not long for the communist regime, they long for the relationships, the
objects, the people, the values, and the events of the time that gave them a greater sense of
belonging. As Berdahl emphasizes, the people long for the sense of security regarding their
identity the time period provided in retrospect.
Prior to ultimately framing my definition of political nostalgia, however, I would like to
extend a methodological view of the two originating sources of nostalgia that Velikonja purports
to strengthen the case as to why political nostalgia in Bulgaria is not only present, but
continuously on the rise. According to Velikonja, nostalgia originates in two ways: naturally or
artificially. A natural origination of political nostalgia occurs out of the aforementioned
dissatisfaction with the status quo. This political nostalgia is considered “bottom-up” because it
is a popular conviction that has amassed due to collective dissatisfied sentiments.32 Signs of
naturally occurring political nostalgia appear through public opinion surveys showing discontent
with the present, interviews with individuals displeased with their current state, and a rise in
popularity of consumer goods from past times which fare better on a domestic market than the
consumer goods produced in the present.33 As later chapters will detail, public opinion polls,
interviews with Bulgarian citizens, and the consumption of consumer goods from past times will
exhibit that all of these conditions persist in Bulgaria. Velikonja describes artificial nostalgia, on
the other hand, as a top-down artificial sentiment imposed by a group to achieve a certain goal.
The sentiment is artificial because dissatisfaction is not a personal attitude, but rather
materialized in popular discourse through the infiltration of material to breed discontent with the
present.34 Thus, artificial nostalgia is top-down. Artificial nostalgia aims to accrue political
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capital, gain popular support, or make a new commercial niche profitable.35 In short, individuals
subject to such nostalgia are either not truly unsatisfied with the present or their dissatisfaction is
capitalized on and intensified through influential actors. Artificial nostalgia can, therefore, utilize
natural nostalgia for political gains. While understanding that nostalgia can occur naturally or
artificially, I will argue that political nostalgia originally developed naturally within Bulgaria;
however, political parties have noticed and capitalized on this nostalgia through artificial
nostalgia to advance their political agendas, making Bulgarian political nostalgia a phenomenon
which continues to persist and self-regenerate, acting as a positive feedback loop. While natural
nostalgia originated during the period of the Ottoman empire, Bulgarian political parties in the
21st century have created artificial nostalgia that appeals to the backbone of their platforms,
invoking more discontent in the present day, and, thus, more natural nostalgia as well. Natural
nostalgia thus feeds into artificial nostalgia, creating a problem impossible to solve.
Framing Nostalgia Politically
Now that varying scholarly interpretations of political nostalgia and their applications in
several nations have been discussed in depth, their theories will be used as building blocks to
craft the following definition of political nostalgia unique to this thesis: Political nostalgia
originates from a longing to return to a past home due to natural public dissatisfaction towards
the present, even though dissatisfaction is artificially intensified by influential political actors.
The phenomenon romanticizes a glorified selective past, which prescribes a utopia contrary to
the status quo built upon the nostalgic individual’s glorified moments of history by attempting to
recreate them through social movements, policy recommendations, and party platforms.
Therefore, though political nostalgia’s romantic tone is universal, it often contains multiple

35
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distinct utopian visions, thus making its execution infeasible as a result of competing nostalgias
born out of differing societal discontents. I will define political nostalgia under the following
qualifications: a retrospective and prospective view, a utopian undertone, and the lack of a
universal perception. In later chapters, I will discuss the manifestation of each qualification
within the Bulgarian narrative.
A longing to return to a past home, whether it no longer exists or never truly did, shows a
discontent with the present. The present induces nostalgia, as individuals entirely satisfied with
their present condition and state would not dwell in yearning to return to a past reality.36 Thus,
nostalgia hints at one’s hopes for the future. In short, regardless of whether nostalgia dwells on a
romanticized past or a past reality, it is prospective. In order to dispel the presence of nostalgia,
elements of the past currently lacking in the present must manifest into future realities through
political action. Political nostalgia naturally manifests when societal discontent invokes social
movements or inspires politicians to develop policies and promises as a response to discontent,
giving people hope that “there must be a society that is better than the current.”37 The artificial
origination of nostalgia, however, arises when politicians either utilize their platforms as a way
to breed or intensify public discontent with the present, to support already established policies
they wish to act on. Under natural political nostalgia, policy is a means to quell discontent, while
under artificial nostalgia, political action is a way to advance a political agenda.
The selective and prospective nature of nostalgia lends its application to hold great
subjectivity, allowing politicians to draw on the mourning within the national narrative whenever
it suits them best. Political nostalgia allows politicians to entertain the longings of the past
Daphne Berdahl, “‘(N)Ostalgie’ for the Present: Memory, Longing, and East German Things,” Ethnos 64, no. 2
(January 1, 1999):, https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.1999.9981598
37
Mitja Velikonja, “Lost in Transition: Nostalgia for Socialism in Post-Socialist Countries,” East European Politics
and Societies, October 2, 2009, 535, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325409345140.
36
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through policy proposals. If promises to entertain certain nostalgias are made but not met, a
reactionary heightened public discontent results due to the perceived likelihood of a utopias
actualization. Thus, as the public’s desire for the utopia grows, politicians can capitalize on this
fervor and promise to be the change that the public desires. This becomes dangerous, as it grants
individuals hope that their utopian nostalgic desires will fruition, spurring more fanatic utopian
desires.
A people’s dissatisfaction and ability to romanticize the past grants nostalgia a utopian
undertone. According to Boym, in order to escape the unsatisfactory conditions of the present
“nostalgic desires turn history into private or collective mythology, [allowing one] to revisit time
like space, refusing to surrender to the irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition.”38
Allowing one’s memory of the past to transcend accuracy and take on glorified and falsified
myth-like characteristics makes nostalgia a cyclical phenomenon. The greater the discontent with
the present and the unfulfillment of an individual’s expectations, the more romanticized the past
will become. And the more utopian the past becomes through such romanticization, the higher
the degree of nostalgia because of one’s infatuation with this idyllic glorified past.39 However,
the inability to ever execute such utopian desires in the future due to their infeasibility only
increases one’s dissatisfaction—allowing for the cyclical nature of nostalgia to begin once again.
Bulgarian Political Nostalgia
The belief in the ‘Bulgarian curse’ of backwardness following its transition to a
democracy furthered the negativity in the national narrative, and led to varying utopian views of

Svetlana Boym, “Nostalgia and Its Discontents,” Hedgehog Review 9, no. 2 (2007): 8.
Mitja Velikonja, “Lost in Transition: Nostalgia for Socialism in Post-Socialist Countries,” East European Politics
and Societies, October 2, 2009, 547, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325409345140.
38
39
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the past, showing its presence most within the agrarian society, extreme-right political parties,
and Bulgaria’s imagined poor majority—which encompassed individuals who felt cheated and
poor by the elite as a result of Bulgaria’s transition out of communism. The switch from a Soviet
paternalism—which provided basic needs for the people—to a capitalist program that required
greater degrees of self-initiative40 proved to be one of the largest changes to everyday life. The
agrarian population felt it difficult to adjust to such expectations, and many economists,
development experts, and politicians—both in the West and within the nation—blamed this on
“their conservatism, their age, their ignorance, and their character.”41 Individuals felt the
transitionary period did not provide the support necessary for them to acclimate, leaving them
feeling left behind and dissatisfied with the nation’s ignorance towards their condition.42 The rise
in natural dissatisfaction appears in public opinion polls, which showed that in 2002 threefourths of Bulgarian respondents believed their social position had dropped since the end of the
Communist regime in 1989.43 Such results support Velikonja’s aforementioned claim that natural
nostalgia arises popular conviction amassed around a despondent national narrative from
collective dissatisfied sentiments—though it will be exploited by current parties.
Furthermore, Bulgarian political nostalgia grew through varying romanticized accounts of
the past, as subsets of the population developed conflicting utopias. As Volen Siderov—the most
well-known Bulgarian far-right nationalist and leader of the nationalist party ATAKA—details
in Foundations of Bulgarism, extremist right-wing parties cherish a Bulgarian nationalism that is

40
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“an ethical defense of nationalism; an insistence on the ancient origins of the Bulgarians, who are
one of the oldest autochthonic peoples and civilizations in Europe.”44 Essentially, Bulgarian
nationalists dreamed of restoring the apogee of the Second Bulgarian Empire and distorted the
ethnic purity and zeal of this period. The first extreme nationalist parties in Bulgaria arose
following Bulgaria’s transition to a democracy, as name-changing campaigns during the Balkan
Wars and the Communist regime failed, appealing to the extreme nationalists’ fervor by
promising their expectations would be met through the party’s prospective policies.45 Though the
Turkish yoke naturally created nostalgia of a cultural and ethnical homogenous Bulgaria, the
platform of ATAKA aimed to validate and intensify anger towards ethnic groups for political
clout of its nationalist agenda—exhibiting exploitation of discontent through artificial nostalgia.
Agrarians, on the other hand, were nostalgic of the state security they once had. Clearly, the
policies political parties adopt when drawing on these nostalgic desires will vary and, potentially,
conflict, as they require the fulfillment of different needs. Thus, the use of nostalgia as a basis for
policy creation highlights the needs of different Bulgarian population subsets, making it nearly
impossible to use nostalgia as a tactic to develop a reality best for all, and, thus, improve the
Bulgarian narrative.
This leads us to the final qualifier for Bulgarian political nostalgia: Political nostalgia is
subjective as Bulgarians are dissatisfied with different aspects of the status quo. Therefore, the
utopia imagined within nostalgia will never be attained, as what is required to restore Bulgarian
greatness alters among subgroups. The presence of nostalgia merges personal and collective
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memory,46 and even if the collective memory of a population may be quite uniform, no personal
memory ever will be. Therefore, different memories breed different critiques of the present. And
because varying personal experiences lead to different dissatisfactions, the utopian past one
yearns for will never be the same as that of another. While nostalgia might tell us more about the
present than the past, it does so through a subjective prospective lens—lacking a standard and
objective perspective towards what must be done to attain a more agreeable future which
satisfies all dissatisfaction with the present, even those sentiments at odds with one another.
Bulgarian historian Maria Todorova notes that the varying difficult circumstances the
Bulgarian people endured produced “nostalgic hybrids with a significant dose of negativity and
precautionary counter-discourses.”47 These hybrids and counter-discourses, however, created
alternate utopias that, despite signifying dissatisfaction with the present, make it difficult to
envision a more satisfactory future that appeases the demands of opposing nostalgic hybrids.
While dissatisfaction breeds nostalgia, the counter-discourses Todorova highlights cannot be
assumed to be complementary or universal.
The Dangers of Political Nostalgia
The largest danger of political nostalgia is the threat to progress its utopian nature creates
and the threat to freedom and a common homeland its subjectivity presents. In sum, political
nostalgia threatens an irreversible stagnation as a consequence of the utopian, prescriptive, and
subjective nature of nostalgia. Combined, these allow desires of competing ideal futures to be
manipulated for political clout through policymakers, making individuals even more fanatic
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regarding an ideal future due to their adulation with the utopian past and a political actors power
to selectively pursue aspects of their utopian dreams.48 Nostalgia colonizes politics because its
romantic nature does not allow individuals to perceive reality past the utopian. As nostalgia
breeds off of constitutional imagination, the mix of nostalgia and politics becomes explosive.49
Recognition of political nostalgia by policymakers creates confusion between an
imaginary and an actual home. Even more, the idealistic and unrealistic nation this recognition
creates is so powerful that it can create an obsession with a phantom homeland, a homeland that
is merely a figment of one’s imagination. To some, this phantom homeland can become so
desirable and perfect, that it makes them ready to die or kill for.50 In the case of Bulgaria, the
presence of political nostalgia allows fantasies to run rampant, making political parties, such as
ATAKA and others Chapter Four will discuss, capable of pursuing divisionary societal policies
in hopes of the resurgence of the homogenous and ‘superior’ Bulgarian identity of the Second
Bulgarian Empire. Siderov’s statements regarding ATAKA’s vision for Bulgaria depict this.
Therefore, political nostalgia allows a democracy to peacefully coexist with platforms supporting
authoritarian qualities and an outdated nostalgic national identity.51 Democracy peacefully grants
political actors or parties an attempt to attain the utopian past others romanticize, amassing into
cult-like followings and creating a threatening environment for identities which do not fall under
the subjective utopia. Mourning of a past that can never be reversed breeds an unreflective
monster which allows for fanaticism and elongated melancholy to infiltrate the minds of a people
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and define their national narrative in unrealistic but irreversible ways. Such is the case with
Bulgaria.
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Chapter 2: The Past Is Prologue
The purely national Bulgarian, who has understood and seen the sorrows and troubles of our
dear people, who has already felt in his heart the daily and bloody tears of our disgraced
mothers, brothers and sisters from the tyrant, for him, there is no fear, no excuses, and his death
is his very consolation and salvation of the soul. [This] death deserves the above-mentioned
glory of the Bulgarian people. Otherwise [if he does not act in this way] he is not a Bulgarian,
he is not a Christian, he is not a man. Therefore, to him death, death and death.
—Vasil Levski
The Ottoman Occupation
Known throughout Bulgaria as the Apostle of Freedom, Vasil Levski’s sentiments
represent the fervid antipathy of the Bulgarian people towards their five-century Ottoman
Occupation. Bulgarians still resent the period of the Ottoman Occupation, spanning from 1396 to
1878, due to it’s being laden with injustice and bloodshed as a result of forced Muslim
conversion.52 The Ottoman Empire—the “tyrant” Levski refers to—became so hated within the
Bulgarian narrative that many considered dying for Bulgaria’s freedom more honorable than
succumbing to the power and religion of the Ottomans. While there are disputes among scholars
over the degree of tyranny during the Ottoman rule, distinguishing the Bulgarian sentiment is
necessary to understanding the origination of an increasingly despondent national narrative and
its influence on igniting political nostalgia.
Prior to Bulgaria’s subjugation by the Ottomans, the First and Second Bulgarian Empires,
aside from a short conquest by the Byzantine Empire, were periods of great prosperity for an
ethno-homogenous and ethno-religious Slav population. The First Bulgarian Empire, under
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Simeon the Great, witnessed the adoption of Christianity and a flowering of literature.53 The
Second Bulgarian Empire, under Ivan Asen II, led Bulgaria to its most eminent period through
extending the kingdom to its greatest geographical extent, defeating both the Magyars and the
Crusaders, establishing adept diplomatic ties, and enriching Bulgarian culture.54 Bulgaria was the
master of its own fate and the power of the Bulgarian Empire was held together through its
powerful monarchs. Following the death of Ivan Alexander, the Bulgarian dynasty was deposed
and the state was dissolved with the invasion of the Ottomans.55 Bulgaria would not exist as a
state for almost half a millennium.
Transitioning from a period of economic, cultural, and diplomatic, and political affluence
to one of subordination during the Ottoman Occupation led Bulgarians to demonize the
Ottomans. Of the changes, the greatest offenses to the Bulgarian people were the coercive and
assimilative mass Islamic conversions. To spare their lives, some Bulgarian Christians converted
to Islam. Surviving Bulgarian Christians who escaped conversion classified those who converted
as “Pomaks.”56 The Bulgarian narrative portrayed Pomaks as victims and the Ottoman Empire
and Muslims as the perpetrators of these grievances. In the 1893 novel Pod Igoto (Under the
Yoke), Ivan Vasov “paints a picture of pre-liberated Bulgaria as a society crushed under the
weight of an oppressive and arbitrary yoke of Oriental Ottoman despotism. Vazov's image of the
Turk is that of an unequivocally cruel, if not bestial, alien interloper, occupying and preying on
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essentially ‘Bulgarian’ cultural and material belongings."57 Thus, the negative trend of the
national narrative was born as a dissatisfaction to the jarring alteration in status quo.
Several newer Bulgarian sources and foreign scholars, however, conclude that Islamic
conversion was the product of “gradual and voluntary intermarriage, or mass voluntary
conversion in the case of the Pomaks.”58 While the coercive nature of the conversions is
contested, “most Bulgarian sources still adhere to the forced conversion thesis”59 and several
foreign historians, such as Peter Sugar,60 accept the theory of forced conversion.61 While
acknowledging this contention is important, for the purposes of this thesis and its focus on the
Bulgarian narrative, forced conversion will be presumed.
The Ottomans’ coercive assimilative practices led most Bulgarians to flee to remote
villages in the mountains. These settlements were all between 150-200 inhabitants and were
rarely visited by Ottoman officials for purposes other than tax collection.62 So many Bulgarians
fled to the mountains that only one-in-fifty Christian Bulgarians resided in towns.63 These
isolated and ethnically homogenous villages preserved the Bulgarian language, Bulgarian names,
folk tales, legends, festivals, and traditions.64 Along with safeguarding Christian Bulgarian life,
these villages inoculated an intricate peasant tradition. The remote settlements’ role in preserving
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Bulgarian culture ingrained a sense of honor and respect of the peasant tradition within the
Bulgarian narrative. The Bulgarian peasant tradition upheld the memories of the apogee from the
Second Bulgarian Empire. The homogenous nature of these villages, however, institutionalized a
‘herd’ mentality which also infiltrated the Bulgarian narrative.65 The privacy and sanctity of the
remote mountain villages functioned as a survival mechanism for Christian Bulgarians, portrayed
through the Bulgarian proverb “Slonena glavica, sabj ne j seche” (A bent head, no sword can
cut).66 Peasants developed a belief that keeping their presence discrete was the only way for the
Bulgarian people to survive the occupation.67 This insular groupthink persisted throughout the
entire occupation and adumbrated the reasons for its lengthy duration. While the preservation of
Bulgarian culture can be credited to this cautious nature, the development of this herd mentality
also explains why Christian Bulgarians lacked incentives for liberation sooner. Thus, Bulgarian
peasants both spurred Bulgarian nationalism into the narrative and negativity regarding
complacency of the Bulgarian people.
While Christian Bulgarians sheltered in these homogenous peasant villages, the Habsburg
and Russian Empires made advances and defeated the Ottoman military several times—in 1699,
1718, and 1774—leading to the secession of Ottoman territories.68 These were the first military
defeats of the Ottomans, granting Bulgarian peasants an opportunity to abandon their selfcontained herd narrative of avoidance and hope for change. Around this period, in 1762, Saint
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Paisius of Hilendar composed Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya (History of the Slav-Bulgarians)—
the first work on Bulgarian historiography which accentuated Bulgaria’s greatness.69 Paisius’
work and validation of the Ottoman’s weakening grip over occupied territories revived the
Bulgarian spirit and enlivened hopes towards liberation, coining this period as the Bulgarian
National Revival. While the revival began as decentralized buzz within Christian Bulgarian
villages, the synchronicity in the rise of Bulgarian pride and hope culminated into a more
centralized Bulgarian nationalist movement in the 1800s, and, eventually, the Liberation of
Bulgaria.70 Not only this, but reminiscence of Bulgarian greatness further brewed in the national
narrative. However, actions of the West would soon pivot this hope into resentment, making
Bulgarian greatness a utopian belief, kickstarting nostalgia’s birth.
Beginning in the 1800s, Western nations started drawing explicit distinctions between
ethnicities, nationalities, and geographical locations to undermine Eastern and Asian identities as
their less-developed subordinates.71 Such sentiments portrayed Bulgaria, similarly to Russia, as
“semi-European at best” and a hybrid, incomplete nation within Europe.72 This only furthered
the Bulgarian National Revival, fueling a passion to show the “European-ness” of Bulgarians,
despite their being under Asiatic occupation. While aspiring to develop to the standard of
Western European nations, Bulgarians believed that the impositions from Ottoman rule held
them back, rendering their status in Europe tentative. Such perceptions only increased Bulgarian
desire to separate from the “barbaric” Muslims. Even though Bulgarians saw themselves as some
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of the oldest autochthonic civilizations in Europe, dissatisfaction arose within the narrative as the
rest of the West would not acknowledge this fact.
Despite attempts to display Bulgaria’s European-ness to Western nations, Bulgarian
resentment towards the West simultaneously intensified. Western constructs of Europe “as a
paragon of progress and Christendom as opposed to Turco-Muslim barbarism,”73 spawned
Bulgarian expectations for European assistance towards gaining freedom from the Ottomans.
Western nations, however, never came to the aid of their Christian Balkan neighbors—seemingly
only reveling in their own development. In an 1857 poem, Bulgarian revolutionary leader
Lyuben Karavelov’s words about Europe’s lack of action accurately portray the sentiments of the
Bulgarian people towards the West: "’Don't raise your head so high holy Europe, don't be so
proud of your civilization and your Christianity when you don't have a pure heart or a clear
conscience.’"74 The West’s five centuries of silence led Bulgarians to believe that Western
powers only intervened in the Balkan region when competing for spheres of influence.75 The
West was a role model yet an anathema for the Bulgarian people. Dissatisfaction of the status
quo increased in the narrative, as the utopian vision of a Great Bulgaria became stronger, due to
a lack of fulfillment of expected promises.
While the Bulgarian National Revival began as a decentralized desire to revive the
Bulgarian spirit, this nationalism was institutionalized through the formation of the Bulgarian
National Liberation Movement by the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee (BRCC) in
1869, a movement that “envisaged liberation through revolution, mass participation of the
people, destruction of Ottoman feudalism, and the fundamental social and political restructuring
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of Bulgarian society.”76 The BRCC’s goal to prepare the Bulgarian people for a revolution
incited a rise in egalitarian thought and culminated in the BRCC-organized April Uprisings of
1876, a staged massacre of Muslim civilians which then led to the slaughtering of 12,000—
15,000 Bulgarian Christians77. Despite immense loss of life, Bulgarians achieved their goal of
“urg[ing] outside intervention [to address the occupation] by provoking the Turks into
bloodshed”78 and coined the event “the epic of the forgotten”— one of “’the most glorious’
pages of modern Bulgarian history.”79 Although the Uprising signified the moment Western
Europe’s silence ceased, the Bulgarian people would continue to resent the human cost that was
required to garner Western attention. William Gladstone, a nineteenth-century British Prime
Minister, “helped raise public indignation over the ‘Turkish atrocities’ against Bulgarians with
images of the ‘Turkish infidel’ lording over ‘European Christians.’”80 Gladstone’s campaign was
rooted in the prominent Western propaganda which undermined Eastern and Asian identities; the
long-awaited Western support towards dismantling the Ottoman regime, therefore, arose from a
self-interest to preserve the exemplar status of Western nations and further demote opposing
identities, not secure autonomy for the Bulgarian people. The West did little other than protect
their own status. Despite vocally announcing their support, Western Europe did nothing to
support Bulgaria in terms of manpower. If actions speak louder than words, the West was still
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radio silent. Soon after however, with the implicit support of the West, the Russian Empire’s
invasion of Ottoman Bulgaria led to the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War. After winning the war,
Russia sponsored the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3rd, 1878,81 establishing an autonomous
Bulgarian polity and expanding Bulgaria into modern-day Macedonia and Thrace—territories
held by the Bulgarian Empire prior to the Ottoman Occupation.82 Russia’s influential role
towards Bulgarian liberation and revival of Bulgarian greatness through the territorial expansion
within the treaty popularized the folklore of the Russian Christian protector “Diado Ivan”
(Grandpa Ivan), the liberator of the Ottoman oppression.83 The importance of this fable and
alignment with Russia was because it reversed some of the nostalgic thought which perceived
revival of greatness as solely utopian. For a mere moment, it seemed plausible.
Bulgaria’s affinity with Diado Ivan perturbed Western Europe. On June 13th, 1878–three
months following the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano–Western powers summoned Russia
and the Ottoman Empire to the Congress of Berlin with the goal of restructuring the Balkan map,
in hopes to curtail the expansion of Russian influence over a larger geographical region.
Bulgarian affinity of Russia concerned The meeting produced the Treaty of Berlin, an agreement
which severely truncated Bulgaria’s newly regained territory.84 Bulgarian animosity towards the
West only amplified, affirming previous assumptions that Western involvement in the Balkans
materialized only when they were concerned with losing influence in the region. The Bulgarian
narrative pummeled. To date, this would be the smallest geographical reach of Bulgaria.
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Bulgarian dissatisfaction of the status quo was at its peak and a powerful Bulgaria again became
only a utopian dream.
Post Ottoman Occupation
Upon gaining independence on March 3rd, 1878,85 Bulgaria adopted a democratic
constitution and elected Stefan Stambolov, of the Liberal Party, as Prime Minister. Despite
popularity amongst Bulgarians, the Russian Empire was not fond of Stambolov’s liberal policies.
Bulgaria’s monarch history prior to the Occupation, as demonstrated through the prosperity of
the Bulgarian empires, led the nation to appoint a Prince, despite there being no surviving
Bulgarian heirs to the throne due to the Ottoman Occupation. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha
was appointed, and Bulgaria became a constitutional monarchy. 86 Ferdinand’s more
conservative policies pleased Russia and led to the assassination of Stambolov, due to their
frequent disagreements. In 1908, Ferdinand declared himself Tsar and Bulgaria an independent
kingdom.87
The Turkish Yoke
The West’s hesitance towards Bulgaria’s belonging in Europe furthered an inferiority
complex in the Bulgarian narrative that bred anger and frustration. These sentiments of betrayal,
abandonment, animosity, and helplessness amalgamated into the aforementioned theory of the
Turkish yoke. To reiterate, the Turkish yoke was modeled the Russian “Tatar yoke,” which
posited that Russian backwardness was a direct result of over two centuries of Mongolian-Tatar
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rule… [and that] the Mongols held Russia back from the general path of ‘Western civilization,’
but Russia had actually saved Europe by holding back the Mongols.88 The Turkish yoke consists
of an accusatory tone and hints at an over compensatory superiority complex. In addition to
understanding the growingly negative national narrative, the feelings behind the Turkish yoke
are pivotal to understanding Bulgaria’s reception of Marxism, their role in WWI and WWII, the
Communist regime, and the nation’s slow and bumpy transition to a democracy.
Despite gaining independence, the Turkish yoke still persisted in the minds of the
Bulgarian people. As generations of Pomaks gradually accepted Muslim practices, their adoption
of Turko-Ottoman names—both in their persons and landmarks—were constant reminders of
Bulgarian hardship and Bulgaria’s inferior status in Europe. Thus, many nationalist thinkers and
organizers believed that the shirking of the Turkish yoke was necessary for Bulgarian prosperity.
Removing all remnants of the Ottomans would also purify the Bulgarian image in the West.
Likewise, lifting the Turkish yoke would unite Bulgarians and avenge the maltreatment of the
Pomaks. While extreme policies to remove the Turkish yoke would not be pursued until the
1900s, the notion of removing the yoke came following Bulgarian independence and remains
relevant throughout every stage in Bulgaria’s development. Bulgaria became overshadowed by
the yoke, it not only instilled negative sentiments within the narrative but initiated beliefs that
hope was useless.
The Birth of a Culture of Oplakvane (Complaining)
In addition to the torment from the Turkish yoke, the practice of oplakvane (complaining)
about the Bulgarian condition emerged among its people, furthering the concept of hope as futile.
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Bulgaria’s long occupation, hope for a Western rescue that wouldn’t come, and betrayal by the
Treaty of Berlin made the nation distrustful of many, if not all, European nations. Katherine
Verdery89, a prominent socialist scholar, alleges this developed a strong “Us vs. Them” mentality
in Bulgaria and other Balkan nations, such as Romania, who fell under the Ottoman Empire. This
mentality arises from the belief that the nation—Bulgaria, in this case—is an innocent victim
subjugated and oppressed by another nation.90 The effects of this mentality and oplakvane also
appear in the Turkish yoke through frustration towards the West’s ignorance of Bulgaria’s tacit
contribution towards their development. Through attributing Bulgaria’s backwardness to the
Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria identifies as the innocent victim oppressed by the Ottomans and
complains that, had it not been for the Ottomans, Bulgaria would not have fallen victim to
scrutiny from the West and such underdevelopment.
The Ottoman Occupation’s final lasting effect on the Bulgarian narrative was the
formation of a hyper self-deprecating nature, making the practice of oplakvane more prevalent.
The truncation of Bulgaria in the Treaty of Berlin led to further frustration regarding Bulgaria’s
inability to regain the power and influence that they had during the First Bulgarian Empire
between the 8th and 9th centuries.91 Many Bulgarians view the continued failures towards
restoring the nation’s previous might as something “genetically wrong with the nation.”92
Oplakvane, however, instilled the perspective that the West’s ignorance and Turkish oppression

89

Verdery is an anthropologist, author, professor, and prominent Socialist scholar.
Sotirova, Nadezhda. “The ‘Bulgarian Situation’: Constructing the Myth of a ‘national Mentality’ in Bulgarian
Discourse and Its Effect on Agency.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 6 (December 2018): 566.
http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1493857.
91
Crampton, R. J. “The National Revival and the Liberation.” Chapter. In A Concise History of Bulgaria, 2nd ed.,
80. Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511996870.007
92
Sotirova, Nadezhda. “The ‘Bulgarian Situation’: Constructing the Myth of a ‘national Mentality’ in Bulgarian
Discourse and Its Effect on Agency.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 6 (December 2018): 571.
http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1493857.
90

33

were responsible for Bulgaria’s underprivileged nature, not the Bulgarian people themselves.
Oplakvane, therefore, developed as a mechanism to cope with a growing self-deprecating nature.
This can be seen through the underlying chagrin towards isolationist practices of ChristianBulgarians during the occupation and the redirection of this sentiment through frustration
towards the West and the Turks. Thus, oplakvane involved a frustration not only with the
“Them” but also with the “Us,” though the former was a defense mechanism avoiding the latter.
Perhaps that is why interviewees prescribe going to a “normal country” and not dedicating one’s
life to improving the Bulgarian condition. The exacerbation of oplakvane drives the rise of
political nostalgia. As this section shows, the worsening of the national narrative spurred the
utopian perception of Bulgarian history, igniting nostalgia. In the following sections, the
subjective and prospective qualities of nostalgia will be introduced through their fabrication as a
result of war and the platforms of political parties, ignited by the initial romanticization of a
utopian past.
Ferdinand’s Plan For Recovery
The over-compensatory nature of the Bulgarian people represented by the Turkish yoke
and oplakvane placed the solidification of Bulgaria's legitimacy and status in Europe on the
forefront of Prince Ferdinand’s agenda. Following liberation from Ottoman rule, Ferdinand
initiated national development projects from 1887-1897, financed through borrowed money from
foreign markets. To fund such development, Ferdinand frequently increased peasant taxes.
However, the influence of the Bulgarian National Revival, it’s admiration of peasantry, and its
accentuation of Bulgarian greatness resulted in “three-fourths of the population [living] in
villages and [engaging] in small scale farming, with agriculture contributing 59% of net material
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output in 1948 and industry just 23%.”93 Bulgarian peasants thus developed a growing
displeasure towards Ferdinand because they received the brunt of the cost of development. This
frustration was compounded by the fact that Ferdinand was viewed as an outsider, having no
Bulgarian roots and lacking as fervent a desire towards Bulgarian nationalism. Unlike the
Christian-Bulgarian peasants of the Occupation, however, peasants frustrated with Ferdinand did
not abide by the herd-mentality which deferred to the passing of time to appease unsatisfactory
conditions. Instead, the increased nationalist zeal for peasant admiration led peasants throughout
rural Bulgaria to congregate and establish the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU).
While initially the BANU was an organization set to peacefully protest Ferdinand’s taxation
policies, its widespread peasant support convinced its leaders to become a political party.
Aleksandur Stamboliiski would become the most prominent figure in the movement.94 The rise
of the BANU pushed discontent with self-induced backwardness aside and instead propelled a
revolutionary and nationalist sentiment into the Bulgarian narrative that continued to portray the
West and Turks as our persecutors, exacerbating oplakvane. This signifies the first rise of
subjectivity and perspectivity to promulgate the political framing of nostalgia. Bulgarian
peasants remained nostalgic for a utopian Bulgarian peasant history, creating a subjective interest
for nationalism which deviated from the desire for development to prove Bulgarian Europeanness to the West. Instead, the peasants wanted to accentuate their Bulgarian identity. This
nostalgic account allowed the BANU to establish a platform with prospective policies to return
to this reality. While Ferdinand’s actions were also motivated by the shirking of the yoke, the
utopia Ferdinand aimed to actualize was one that shirked the yoke through westernization. The
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BANU, on the other hand, prioritized a different aspect of Bulgarian history and pursued
actualizing an alternate political nostalgia.
The Balkan Wars and WWI: Furthering the Perception of Bulgarian Damnation
While these political groups were evolving in Bulgaria, Ferdinand, alongside all other
Balkan nations, was focused on restoring the Bulgarian narrative and shirking the note through
improving Bulgaria’s standing on the international stage. Of the Balkan nations under Ottoman
rule in the 19th century, Macedonia was the only nation yet to gain independence by 1912.95
Distrust towards the West and regional Balkan concern that Western intervention in the region
would result in greater truncations of Balkan borders led Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and
Montenegro to negotiate and free Macedonia together.96 Montenegro declared war on the
Ottoman Empire on October 8th, 1912, with the remaining Balkan allies joining ten days later.97
The desire to remove the Turkish yoke through the war, however, was so strong that
Bulgaria’s actions extended past solely seizing the remainder of the Ottomans’ Balkan territory.
The First Balkan War led to the first Pomak name-changing campaigns. As Bulgarian forces
entered the Ottoman-occupied land, they perceived themselves as “liberators” of the Pomaks.
Accompanied by Orthodox priests, Bulgarian forces converted over 200,000 Pomaks from Islam
to Christianity in the Ottoman-contested areas of Thrace, Macedonia, and the Rhodope Islands.98
For Bulgarians, the Pomak renaming was symbolic of marking territory with Bulgarian
ownership, thus reclaiming heredity and reinstating Bulgarian greatness through the shirking of
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the Turkish yoke. While agrarians were displeased with Ferdinand’s past taxing methods, such
policies aligned with elements present in their nostalgia. Not only were Pomaks converted to
Christianity, but they were also forced to take Bulgarian names and surnames, replace their
Turkish fezzes with traditional Bulgarian hats, and cover their homes with crosses, bibles, and
other objects which held Bulgarian meaning.99 Restoring Bulgarian dominance through such
aggressive measures was not only an attempt to reassure the Bulgarian people that the nation’s
revival was feasible, but also to prove that Bulgaria deserves legitimacy in the eyes of Western
Europe. Essentially, an attempt to appease the worsening narrative.
Bulgaria’s well-trained and well-equipped army represented the military might of the
Balkan allies and led to the gradual decline and massive defeat of the Ottoman Empire, which
lost 83% of its remaining European territory.100 Following Balkan victory, the Treaty of London
signed on May 30th, 1913 declared that the former Ottoman territories would be divided amongst
the Balkan allies as they saw fit.101 Bulgaria was not pleased with this outcome, as the nation
believed the territorial split ought to be proportional and that it deserved a larger share because it
committed the most soldiers to the war. Greece and Serbia, however, believed the split should be
an equal balance to portray the Balkans as victors “equal in strength.”102 The intentions of
Greece and Serbia, however, were not as pure as their claims to unity made them seem. Concerns
over Bulgaria’s potential expansion and military power arose as a result of Bulgaria’s influential
role in the Ottoman victory, leading Greece and Serbia to secretly signed an agreement to settle
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the contested Ottoman land without Bulgaria’s consent.103 This secret treaty amplified Bulgaria’s
distrust towards other nations present in the question of “Why Us?” How could Greece and
Serbia betray Bulgaria through hidden agreements when the Balkan nations when they all
wanted to unify to gain Western respect? Now even Bulgaria’s Balkan neighbors seemingly did
not view Bulgaria as deserving of reclaiming its greatness and being deemed truly “European.”
The Bulgarian narrative not only worsened, but deepened in beliefs of a loss for hope—the
nation could not even garner the support of its Balkan brothers.
This heightened distrust further charged Bulgarian desire to restore itself and prove
wrong all nations who had only mistreated the Bulgarian people. As the utopian quality of
nostalgia purports, Bulgarians refused to surrender to the irreversibility of time. Thus, Bulgaria
declared war on Greece and Serbia on June 29th, 1913, in hopes to restore territorial loss.104 The
Balkan brotherhood was destroyed, but, of course, Greece and Serbia were liable for the
unfortunate situation within the Bulgarian narrative. With Romania’s mobilization against
Bulgaria, the Second Balkan War was disastrous for both Bulgarian morale and prosperity.
Bulgaria conceded territory that it had acquired when gaining independence and witnessed more
lives lost than in the First Balkan War,105 a terrible blow to hopes of a revived Bulgarian
greatness in the Bulgarian narrative. Furthermore, Pomak name-changing operations fell flat. In
masses, Pomaks migrated out of Bulgarian territories that they had inhabited for more than a
thousand years,106 signaling that Pomaks might not have felt as “Bulgarian” as Bulgarians
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previously thought. After Bulgaria’s defeat in the Second Balkan War, the interim regime
announced Pomaks could convert back to Islam, reclaim their former names, and adorn their
tradition clothing—measures that most Pomaks decisively embraced.107 This was a sign that,
despite forceful efforts, the Turkish yoke was a stain Bulgarians could not wash out. The
narrative had officially transitioned from one reminiscent with tones of dissatisfaction to one of
irreversibility.
As Bulgaria was dealing with managing its casualties, restoring the nation, and paying for
the Balkan wars, World War I (WWI) erupted. Bulgaria’s dire conditions following the Balkan
Wars led Ferdinand to declare a strict and loyal neutrality and a state of emergency.108 As
Bulgaria actively sought loans from Western nations to get back on its feet, the West’s
precondition to lend Bulgaria money only if the nation agreed to follow a policy favorable to the
West in WWI disillusioned Bulgarians. Thus, the thesis that Bulgaria was incapable of proving
it’s worth and gaining the trust of the West was reinforced. Upon securing a loan through a
consortium of German banks with no preconditions, the Allies and Central powers continued to
court Bulgaria due to its strategic position in Europe.109 Ultimately, Bulgaria joined the Central
Powers on October 11th, 1915 for two reasons: greater territorial promises and the perceived
likelihood of a Central Powers victory in the summer of 1915.110 Bulgaria’s decision to enter the
war was detrimental to everyday living conditions in Bulgaria. WWI would exacerbate the
already-present supply issues that inundated the nation following the Balkan Wars. With the cost
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of living increasing 847% from 1914 to 1918, the lack of civilian and military morale was no
surprise.111 Britain and France’s offensive against Bulgaria on Sept.15th, 1918 led to Bulgaria’s
impending collapse and armistice.112 As a result of WWI, Bulgaria had lost 9,000 square
kilometers of territory and 9,000 Bulgarians now found themselves under foreign rule.113
Ferdinand’s oversight of two wars which resulted in significant territorial loss in less than half a
decade cemented Bulgarian hatred towards him and resulted in his abdication and departure from
Bulgaria. His son, Tsar Boris III, succeeded him. If a sliver of hope was left remaining within the
national narrative, it was now surely exhausted.
The living conditions during World War I radicalized and infuriated the peasantry.
Concerns of another revolutionary upheaval led the postwar interim regime to invite
Stamboliiski, leader of the BANU, to form a coalition cabinet. As discontent rose, the
romanticization of the past increased, resulting in this radicalized peasantry and a higher degree
of nostalgia. From 1919 to 1923, the agrarians and the communists were the most dominant
political forces.114 At the time, the BANU and BCP were the only parties truly competing for
vacant seats in elections. As democratic parties grew fearful of the Left’s growing political
authority and the prospects of a one-party state, they established the Constitutional Bloc, a
coalition of Bulgaria’s right-leaning democratic parties.115 Stamboliiski’s actions in April of
1923 further intimidated the Constitutional Bloc. He abolished proportional representation and
the BANU seized 212 seats while the BCP and the Constitutional Bloc only won 16 and 15 seats,
respectively; thus, the reality of a one-party state seemed even more likely and the Constitutional
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Bloc became determined to dismantle its prospects. Members of extreme right-wing factions
supported by the Constitutional Bloc brutally tortured and murdered Stamboliiski on June 14th,
1923 and established a new government under Aleksandur Tsankov, an economist of the
Constitutional Bloc.116 Following a failed attempt at a Communist uprising in September of
1923, the Constitutional Bloc placed severe restrictions on the political liberties and individual
rights of left-wing parties.117 The Constitutional Bloc had successfully immobilized the two most
prominent leftist parties in Bulgaria. As previously discussed, suppression and lowered prospects
of leftist ideas would only result in their romanticization and radicalization through nostalgia.
From the period of 1923-1931, The Democratic Alliance—a coalition of Democratic and
Nationalist Parties—ruled Bulgaria. The BANU and BCP were inactive during this period,
mainly due to continued democratic attempts to cripple their political participation. Poor
economic conditions throughout the Democratic Alliance’s rule, however, renewed public
dissatisfaction, allowing the Communists to rise to prominence once again when they secured
local elections in 1931 and 1932 and took control of the Sofia city council in 1932. Despite this
frequent political turmoil, Tsar Boris III—along with the rest of Europe—focused his attention
on the Nazi seizure of power and Germany’s rapid expansion. Many Bulgarian nationalists
aligned with German foreign policy due to similar frustrations with territorial loss from the
Treaty of Versailles, but Boris was fearful of another European war and believed in neutrality
without commitment. He was once famously quoted as saying that “‘[his] army is pro-German,
[his] wife is Italian, [his] people are pro-Russian. [He] alone [is] pro-Bulgarian.’”118 Boris
perceived neutrality best for the nation, not allowing attractive alliances to sway his vision.

116

Ibid.
Ibid.
118
Ibid., 165.
117

41

Despite Boris’ sentiments, Bulgaria’s economic dependency on Germany would seal its entrance
and alignment in World War II, despite a “deep pro-Russian tradition in every section of
society”119 present following Germany’s termination of its pact with the Soviet Union in the
summer 1941. Bulgaria was, essentially, cornered into this alliance. Bulgaria declared war on
Britain and the United States on December 13th, 1941.
Despite being militarily tied to Germany, the Bulgarian narrative still aligned with leftist
ideals, reflected in public support for the Soviet Union. Thus, Boris remained unwilling to
declare war on Russia despite German military advances in Eastern Europe,120 further proving
the facetious nature of Bulgaria’s alliance with Germany and his “pro-Bulgarian” rhetoric. So,
when Comintern–the Soviet-controlled international organization for communist advocacy–
demanded the development of an anti-fascist people’s front in Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front
(FF) was founded on July 17th, 1942.121 The FF “called for absolute neutrality … withdrawal of
Bulgarian troops from operations against the partisans in Yugoslavia, the removal of the army
from royal control, a ban on the export of food to Germany, the guarantee of a decent standard of
living for all Bulgarians, the full restoration of civil liberties, and a ban on all fascist
organisations.”122 The FF gained popularity within the nation due to its larger progressive vision
for the Bulgarian proletariat. Viewing themselves as the cultural avant-garde to the toxic and
suppressive fascist culture groups like the Democratic Alliance, the FF urged the civilizing
mission for men to become “disciplined, rational, modest, prudent, thoughtful, and cultured,”123 a
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“New Man.” The New Man possessed “the values and behavioral norms of socialism”124 that
brought this ideology into reality. If Bulgarians acted in accordance with the New Man, they
would harmoniously embrace the socialist way of life. Therefore, widespread adoption of the
New Man did not require the BCP to impose communist ideals onto the public; instead, cultural
hegemony would be a product of its adoption. The peasantry’s egalitarian mindset resonated
deeply with the values of the New Man. As the war continued, the Bulgarian public’s proRussian sentiments led to the FF’s popularity and to disdain towards Boris’ regime. Nikola
Petkov, General Secretary of the BANU, famously said “There is no Bulgarian, whatever his
politics, who does not believe that friendly Soviet-Bulgarian relations and sincere cooperation
with the Soviet Union represent the foundation stone of Bulgaria's foreign policy. The whole
Bulgarian nation, and especially we in the Opposition, believe that this policy best guarantees
both the peace of the Balkans and the interests of Bulgaria.”125 But as Vasil Levski said, “He,
who frees us, will later enslave us.”
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Chapter 3: Enslaved by the Protector
All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.
--George Orwell, Animal Farm
Although widespread adoption of the New Man might seem to be rather sudden, Bulgaria
introduced itself to the seeds of Marxist thought far earlier in its history. Marxist thought was
first introduced in Bulgaria in the middle of the 19th century, gaining popularity predominantly
due to its similarities to the Bulgarian National Liberation Movement.126 As aforementioned, the
movement was founded on the premise of revolutionary liberation, mass civilian participation, an
end to Ottoman control, and social and political restructuring of Bulgarian society. Considering
the movement’s revolutionary and democratic tones, it is not surprising that Marxist thought
surpassed developing capitalist theories in popularity from the 1850-1890s. Marxist tones
resonated with the utopian interpretation of Bulgarian history peasants held. Initially, Marxist
thought occupied the Bulgarian intellectual life, with scholars like Emilia Mineva coining this
the romantic-educational phase of Marxist reception in Bulgaria.127 Beginning in the 1880s,
Bulgarian teachers, lawyers, physicians, and other members of the intelligentsia gathered in
educational societies and reading circles to discuss varying socio-political ideas predominant
during the period.128 With the platform of the Bulgarian National Liberation Movement closely
aligning to Marxist thought and the presence of intellectual hubs to stimulate conversation and
disperse knowledge, the spread of Marxism in Bulgaria was unintentional yet steadfast.
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As Marxist ideas were published in several Bulgarian journals and newspapers, such as
the Bulgarski Nizhitiz journal, Pravo newspaper, and Social-Democrat (the first Marxist journal
in Bulgaria), Bulgarian Socialists were recognized internationally. Notably, Friedrich Engels
wrote to Stoyan Nokov, editor of Social-Democrat and student in Geneva, personally thanking
him for “carrying the Marxist banner of today’s proletariat to the coasts of the Black and Aegean
Seas.”129 Engagements with Bulgarian youth abroad and the dispersion of Marxism in Bulgarian
publications extended the discussion of the ideology past solely the intelligentsia. As a result,
intellectuals began connecting the philosophy more directly to the working class for greater
receptibility. Bulgarian socialist students abroad and members of educational societies within
Bulgaria interpreted Marxism to call for mass mobilization of the working class. Meanwhile in
St.Petersburg, the rise of a different interpretation of Marxism gained prominence. Dimitar
Blagoev, another Bulgarian student abroad, disseminated the interpretation that Marxist thought
called for the mobilization of the entire society, irrespective of economic class, through the
formulation of “Blagoev’s Group” or “The Party of Russian Social-Democrats” in 1883.130 The
Blagoev Group became the first Social Democratic group in Russia. Tsar Nicholas II of Russia
was unhappy and threatened by Blagoev’s revolutionary activity and extradited him from Russia
in 1885.131 Blagoev’s propagation of Marxist ideas continued upon his return to Bulgaria,
through initiatives to unite the social democratic circles within all Bulgarian cities.
Blagoev’s efforts towards social-democrat unification culminated into the creation of the
Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party (BSDP) in 1891,132 signaling the end of the romanticeducational phase of Marxism. While some Bulgarian socialists viewed the creation of the BDSP
129
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premature due to the already present discrepancies in Marxist interpretation, skeptics believed it
was more important to present a united Socialist front to other parties.133 The rushed creation of
the party led to a brief schism in 1892, during the Second Party Congress—only the party’s
second meeting. Political pressure in Bulgaria led the group to reconvene in 1894, but the
distinct interpretations would soon be unavoidable.134 Those who interpreted Marxist thought to
call for the mobilization of solely the working class became known as “Broads” for their liberal
interpretation of Marxism. Blagoev’s followers, on the other hand, became known as “Narrows”
for their rigid Marxist views. Two further dividing factor that propelled the split were attitudes
towards revolution and collaboration with the bourgeois (“Collaborationism”). While Broads
believed revolution was to be viewed with anticipation but not incited and favored
Collaborationism, the Narrows believed it was their responsibility to enact the revolution and
gaffed at the thought of Collaborationism.135 Such radical differences led to Broads and Narrows
to struggle for party control throughout the rest of the 1890s.
Divisions over Marxist interpretation were also exacerbated on an international level; the
question of Collaborationism led to an international debate among socialists. Thus, 384 delegates
from over 300 labor and socialist organizations in 20 countries convened at the Second
International on July 14th, 1889 to reach harmony among interpretations and work towards
International Socialism.136 Unity was not reached. At the Fifth Congress of the International, “the
majority of the delegates upheld the tenets of orthodox Marxism by rejecting collaboration with
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bourgeois parties.” The Second International brought about two global factions of Marxist
thought: Western Social Democrats (favoring Collaborationism) and Communists under
Vladimir Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party (opposing Collaborationism).137
These distinct global factions led to a second and permanent schism of the BDSP in
March of 1903, when the Narrows and Broads split into distinct parties: the Bulgarian Social
Democratic Workers’ Party (Narrow Socialists) and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Workers
Party (Broad Socialists).138 The Narrow Socialists experienced an organic increase in popularity
among the Bulgarian people, while the Broad Socialists lacked momentum. The Western Social
Democratic Faction–whom the Broads aligned with–was spurred by a western proletariat
receptive to Collaborationism due to Western Europe’s superior industrial development.
Bulgaria’s industrial backwardness and significant peasant population, however, meant the
nation lacked a substantial working-class proletariat population to support Collaborationism.139
The resentful sentiments towards the West present in the Turkish yoke also allowed for minimal
expansion of the party. The Bulgarian narrative prioritized Bulgarian nationalism and returning
to its utopian greatness, not conforming to the West. The similarly strict interpretations regarding
Collaborationism and revolution of the Narrow’s and Bolshevik’s naturally led the Narrow’s to
strongly align with the platform of the Bolsheviks.140 Despite the two parties operating separately
for around 15 years, the Narrows officially adopted the Bolshevik ideology of Marxist-Leninism
and renamed itself the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in 1919.141 This natural alignment and
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popularity of the Narrows was influenced by the more sympathetic perception Bulgarians had of
Russia due to the Occupation. The effortless adoption of the Narrows also signifies the natural
origination of nostalgia. The Russians had, after all, helped Bulgaria in attempts to regain the
greatness of the Second Bulgarian Empire many were nostalgic of. Adopting Marxist-Leninism
officially did not lead to any significant changes in the beliefs of the BCP. The most distinct
interpretation of Marxist-Leninism is militant materialism—the belief in the need to ignite an
interest in the revolutionary force of the proletariat in the struggle against capitalism. This,
however, was already a belief of the Narrows, one of the contentions that led to the schism in
Bulgarian Socialism in 1903, and a belief of the Bulgarian National Liberation Movement.
Bulgarian Socialism officially viewed revolution as a necessary means to a Socialist end. This
adoption allowed for artificial nostalgia that furthered discontent with the current societal divides
and yearned for the revolution.
The introduction and popularity of the Marxist movement, alongside the popularity of the
BANU discussed in Chapter Two, is deeply rooted in Bulgaria’s Ottoman history. While the rise
of Marxism aligned with the revolutionary attitudes reminiscent within the Bulgarian National
Liberation Movement, the popularity of the BANU was rooted in the respect of the peasant
tradition, which preserved Bulgarian culture for five centuries. The tendency to gravitate towards
left egalitarian principles also illustrates why Marxist thought predominated in popularity over
capitalism in the 19th century. This trend would continue, as “three-fourths of the population
lived in villages and were engaged in small scale farming (Bell 1990, 418), with agriculture
contributing 59% of net material output in 1948 and industry just 23%.”142 Therefore, the rise of
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such groups further cemented the revolutionary and nationalistic sentiment into the Bulgarian
narrative.
Bulgaria’s Communist Regime
The consolidation of Communist power did not come without struggle. Bulgarian peasants and
townspeople resisted as few other East Europeans did. The anti-Communist opposition was not
appeased. Rather, it was subdued and crushed by force. From the outset the contest was between
unequals. The Red Army did not intervene directly. It did not have to. Its mere presence provided
the Communists with an overwhelming advantage which their opponents could not overcome.
--Nissan Oren, Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power

Due to this popularity, when a power vacuum appeared in the summer of 1943 with
Boris’ sudden death, and Bulgaria was left with no monarch, an increase in pro-Soviet sentiment
was imminent. Four Prime Ministers would serve in office from his death to the end of WWII:
Bodgan Filov, Petur Gabrovski, Dobri Bozhilov, and Ivan Bagryanov.143 As impoverishment and
inflation plagued Bulgaria and the FF’s popularity grew, the Soviet Union capitalized on proSoviet sentiment to impose an ultimatum: Break with Germany or suffer Soviet occupation.144
However, if Bagryanov followed Soviet instruction, Bulgaria would suffer German occupation.
In attempts to appease relations with the West, Bagryanov reintroduced strict neutrality on
August 17th, 1944.145 The Soviet Union did not deem neutrality drastic enough and did not
respect Bagryanov’s decision. The public was enraged with his decision as well, leading
Bagryanov to resign and allow Konstantin Muraviev, a left-wing agrarian, to assume the Prime
Ministry.146 Muraviev decisively broke diplomatic relations with Germany on September 5th, but
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he was too late.147 The Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria on September 5th, knowing the
popularity of the FF, other leftist groups, and the presence of a sudden and weak temporary
government would allow for a swift assumption of power. The Soviets assumed correctly, and an
FF and BCP coalition removed the temporary government in a peaceful coup on September
9th.148
All of Bulgaria’s previously censored left-wing parties were incorporated into the new FF
coalition: Communists, left-wing Agrarians, and left-wing Social-Democrats.149 Through
directing all previously censored, illegal, and underground organizations into a mass party of
industrial workers and laborers, the coalition formed approximately 90 district committees within
six weeks.150 The FF began publishing the newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo on September 18th,
and it quickly became the widest circulated newspaper in Bulgaria.151 With the circulation of this
new paper, the government expanded the breadth and reach of its influence. Negotiations
between Stalin and Churchill at the Tolstoy Conference on October 9th, 1944 agreed to allow for
greater communist influence. Churchill’s “percentages'' proposal–under which Britain would
concede 90% control of Romania to the USSR in return for British oversight over Greece–was
extended to Bulgaria.152 Initially, this was not of concern to many Bulgarians due to Western
resentment. Stalin favored the FF’s governance in Bulgaria as an immediate postwar strategy: the
party was not overly aggressive, but they did share his goals of a socialist society trumpeted by
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the ideals of the New Man. For Stalin, this was the perfect way to “maintain Soviet dominance
over Eastern Europe without falling apart with the Western Allies.”153
The BCP and FF were expanding rapidly. By the end of 1944, there were 7,292 FF
committees with 26,255 members and 54% of them were Communists. The party’s youth
organization grew from 15,000 to 225,000 members between September 9th and the end of
1944.154 While the other left-wing parties, like the BANU, coexisted within the FF government,
the Communists would amplify aggressive methods towards full government control following
directives from Moscow. After Traicho Kostov, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of
the FF, visited Moscow, the party structure and leadership of the FF was amended with Soviet
input and direction. Anton Yugov, a BCP leader appointed as the Ministry of the Interior of the
FF, played a large role in the consolidation of the Communist regime– most notably through
discharging approximately 30,000 local officials and replacing them with state militia under
communist direction.155 By the end of 1945, he had successfully turned over all local
administration to a communist orientation.
The appointment of a prominent BCP member as the Ministry of Justice granted the
Communist’s jurisdiction regarding who could be tried under the Bulgarian People’s Courts.
While the prosecution of war criminals was required by the terms of Bulgaria’s armistice with
the Allies, the Communists expanded the definition of “fascist” and “war criminal” to try any
individual who did not share their communist ideals. Instead of promoting justice, these courts
became a political means to consolidate and achieve a unified Communist state with no

Brunnbauer, Ulf. “Making Bulgarians Socialist: The Fatherland Front in Communist Bulgaria, 1944-1989.” East
European Politics and Societies 22, no. 1 (2008): 51. http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0888325407311788.
154
Bell, John D. The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
Press, 1986. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/12421867.html.
155
Ibid., 83.
153

51

outspoken opposition. By April 1945, “2,730 [individuals] were condemned to death, 1,305 to
life imprisonment, 5,119 to terms up to twenty years, and 1,516 were acquitted; the fates of 452
defendants could not be determined.”156 In the same year, the Communists convinced the FF to
establish a National Guard which brought 28,581 Communist troops into the army,
commissioned 718 communists with militaristic or partisan tasks, and enrolled another 334
communist youth members into the military academy.157 The censorship of dialogue through
stifling individuals who did not share communist ideals and securing military control paved the
way for Communists to establish a one-party regime.
Vocal opposition from the leaders of the Broad Socialists and BANU regarding
Communist aggression led the Communists to deprive left-wing parties of FF union funds,
access to the press, and party recognition independent from the FF–mimicking the censorship
placed on left-wing parties by the Democratic Alliance the Communists deemed fascist in the
1930s. Deprivation of party liberty and autonomy led Petkov, once an ardent supporter of
Bulgarian alignment with the Soviet Union, to address a letter to the Allied Control Commission
stating that conditions in Bulgaria did not permit free and fair elections – a requirement under the
Yalta Declaration.158 In response, Britain and the United States claimed they objected to the
conditions of the upcoming elections but did not say they would withhold recognition of the
results. The narrative of Western neglect plaguing the Bulgarian narrative continued to increase
as American Diplomat James Byrnes later affirmed that American diplomacy was using Balkan
nations as “bargaining chips, to be traded off for the exclusion of a Soviet voice in the
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occupation of Japan.”159 The perception of the helpless Bulgarian condition was only
promulgated during this period as Bulgaria was slowly enslaved by its previous savior and
further neglected by the West. This time around, even though nostalgia of the utopian past was
present, it could not be expressed politically due to the Communist’s suppressive power.
The Communist Party’s complete takeover of the FF began in the summer of 1947,
amplified due to Petkov’s efforts. After a state report linked the BANU to an underground
terrorist organization on June 4th, 1947, 23 Agrarian deputies were expelled from their posts on
June 9th and Petkov was tried for treason in August.160 In August, Petkov was sentenced to
death, the BANU was outlawed, and all its assets were confiscated.161 The once ardent proponent
of Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation was tortured, murdered with a hammer, and his body hung by
the Soviet-backed Communists on September 23rd. The United States merely extended its
diplomatic recognition on October 1st, it’s feeble intervention in the Communist suppression of
other parties ensured Stalin that he had succeeded in securing a one-party domination of the
FF.162 The Bulgarian narrative was entirely hopeless, the neglect from the international
community was undisputable.
The BCP’s one-party dominance dissolved all opposing political parties and demoted the
FF to a “socio-political organization for the patriotic unity of the Bulgarian people,”163 which
operated under direct control of the Communists. The FF’s became the “’embodiment of the
alliance and friendship, unity of purpose and aims, brotherhood and joint work of communists,
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agrarians and non-party people, a brilliant manifestation of the ideological, moral and political
unity of the Bulgarian people, who are building a socialist society.’"164 Despite the FF’s
Communist reorientation, the principles of the New Man still aligned with the peasant tradition
and their desires that led to the popularity of left-wing parties in the 1920s and 1930s. This
developed a selective nostalgia among the agrarians, clearly torn by the suppression of other
leftist parties but ardent to pursue their radicalized nationalism and thankful for the sense of
identity and belonging Communist ideals of brotherhood and work provided them.
While there were several Communist leaders following the establishment of a one-party
dictatorship, the most prominent Communist leader gained post in 1954: Todor Zhivkov.
Zhivkov would serve as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP for 35 years,
until his removal from the position and end to the Communist regime in 1989. Despite his
lengthy rule, interviews with ordinary Bulgarian citizens who lived during this period exhibit the
public disdain towards Zhivkov. The following quote from Robert Castle’s interview with
university lecturer Rumiana Petrova—one of many as a part of his dissertation titled “Bulgaria’s
Delayed Transition: An Analysis of the Delays in Bulgaria’s Political and Economic Transition
from Socialism to Liberal Democracy”—is representative of most Bulgarians’ views: “it was
such a beautiful surprise to know that Todor Zhivkov is no longer there. We hated him. All of us.
The whole country.”165
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Life Under Communism for the Ordinary Bulgarian
Following the successful establishment of a one-party Communist government, the
Zhivkov regime focused on increasing industrial production to reverse Bulgaria’s growing
backwardness. Unlike Ferdinand, however, the Zhivkov regime placed focus on involving and
addressing the proletariat in industrial initiatives to avoid the upheaval of the peasantry
experienced in 1899. The regime also initiated projects towards electric power plants, shipyards,
chemical work and metallurgical complexes, electrification of railways, new road construction,
and new bridges in cities throughout the nation.166 In addition to establishing some trust towards
socialism in Bulgaria, these projects led to a visible improvement in the standard of living
experienced during the Balkan Wars, WWI, and WWII. The proletariat was given free medical
care, free education, prophylactic health-care facilities, and mountain and seaside vacations in
the vacation homes run by trade unions.167 The professional biography of a Bulgarian miner
claims that mines prior to 1944 were miserable and “the whole place was dripping,” After
September 9th, 1994 and the introduction of new production technologies in the mines, however,
being at the mines “feels like working and singing.”168 Historians credited communist
industrialization plans for making Bulgaria the Eastern European nation who witnessed the most
rapid and drastic change from a rural to an urban, industrialized society.169 Such a rapid
industrial shift provided some relief to the Bulgarian narrative, proving both that Bulgaria was
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capable of persevering past the backwardness imposed from the Turkish yoke and that it did not
need the neglectful West to do so.
The communist actions that improved the Bulgarian narrative most, perhaps, were due to
the facilitation measures of these projects. The introduction of the Brigadier movement, under
which young Bulgarians left their lives to build such projects, made a generation of Bulgarian’s
feel ownership and pride over their contributions to Bulgaria’s steep development.170 Rather than
imposing higher taxes on the peasantry to fund national development as Ferdinand had, the
peasantry felt responsible for Bulgaria’s growth. The brigadier movement conveniently propelled
the vision of the New Man in society, as the young Brigadiers embodied a brotherhood and unity
towards (quite literally) building the communist Bulgaria. While the betterment of conditions
within the mining industry and national projects ameliorated Bulgaria’s narrative, Bulgarian
peasant farmers had varying experiences with communism due to collectivization.
The collectivization of farming was one of the largest systemic changes imposed by the
Zhivkov regime. To achieve a unified, proletariat, and socialist society, the Communist Party
created The Labor Cooperative Agricultural Farms (TKZS) in 1948 to establish an equal and
hegemonic working class. From 1948 to 1958, peasants were pressured to enter their lands into
TKZS cooperative farms through economic coercion and physical violence–despite being
promoted as “voluntary” by the BCP.171 Peasants whose lives were centered around tending to
their land and providing for their families through their private property were shocked.

Castle, Robert. “Bulgaria’s Delayed Transition: An Analysis of the Delays in Bulgaria’s Political and Economic
Transition from Socialism to Liberal Democracy.” ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. Ph.D., City University of
New York, 2013: 36 http://search.proquest.com/wpsa/docview/1467465983/abstract/F9BA037727E14D93PQ/19.
171
Boneva, Tania. “Remembering Communism: Field Studies in Pernik, 1960–1964.” In Remembering
Communism, edited by Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, NED-New edition, 1., 292-293.
Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe. Central European University Press,
2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctt1287c4v.18.
170

56

The older generation of peasants was more negatively affected through such policies than
young peasants due to the career opportunities the BCP created out of the TKZS. If young
peasants were loyal to the party and cooperative in the establishing of TKZS farms, they could
be promoted to managerial positions in the agriculture or industrial sectors – an incentive to
abide by the new regime's collectivization measures.172 Similarly, if peasants did not cooperate
with the party, opportunities to advance the corporate ladder or achieve prestigious social
standing were nonexistent. Unfortunately, success during the Communist period was “largely
unrelated to effort, skill, or honesty on the job” but dependent on party loyalty.173 While the
party promoted a homogenous proletariat, some workers truly were more equal than others
depending on their behavior. Even further, different classes of workers were treated with more
equity than farmers, considering miners were not subject to the collectivization farmers
experienced.
While overall equity was promoted during this period, through successful and harsh
measures, the lives of regular Bulgarians were uniform and constrained. Bulgaria, alongside all
Soviet Bloc nations, experienced chronic and deep shortages—though they varied in length and
product. Shortages were so prominent during this period that the condition inspired the creation
of the term “shortage economies” by Janos Kornia, an internationally acclaimed Hungarian
economist. The story of Boyan Chinkov, a Bulgarian architect from Plovdiv, aptly illustrates
both the shortages and limitations on free speech present during Communism:
There is a large gathering of people in front of a bakery and a fight breaks out. A
policeman promptly arrives at the scene and asks the shopkeeper what has happened. The
shopkeeper points at Chinkov and says that he bought the days’ worth of fried dough and
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told him to give it away for free which caused a stampede. The policeman heads towards
Chinkov who is standing aside with a smile on his face.
Policeman: “What is this? Some kind of provocation?”
Chinkov: “Nothing of the sort. I just wanted to see what life would be like under
communism when everyone will receive according to their needs.”
Allegedly, when Chinkov was sentenced to a jail term for telling jokes, he again
responded with a joke telling the judge: “Thank you for sending me to the only place in
Bulgaria where there is no line to get in.”174
Despite providing Bulgarians with more work opportunities, the communist regime also
led to a great number of limitations on the basic needs and personal liberties of the Bulgarian
people. From Chinkov’s story, a displeasure with the potential inability to receive bread for one’s
family dependent on one’s place in line led to a jail sentencing. As Orwell inferred, despite
promoting equality, there were always individuals who were more equal than others during the
Communist era. And often, the distinction would be made as irrationally as through one’s place
in line.
Like the silencing of many opposition groups from 1944-1947, to achieve consolidation
of the regime, individuals suffered reductions in their personal freedoms. Notably, the regime
outlawed religious worship and transformed religious holidays to have new socialist meanings.
An atheist worldview was promoted mainly through the banning of celebrations of holidays. The
holiday ban towards any celebrations requiring Christian service or the use of a church. Baptisms
were banned, civil marriage was considered the only valid marital union, and funerals and
memorial services were outlawed.175 St. George’s Day, previously linked to fertility and health
for sheep and observed by shepherd families, was transformed to “Shepherd’s Day” and
celebrated by all TKZS members.176 While families did not go to church or attend to Christian
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services, many of them reproduced customs and rites they had learned from their parents within
confined walls, similarly to how the peasantry sustained Bulgarian tradition during the Ottoman
Occupation. The birth of secret practices exhibits natural nostalgia reminiscent of the ChristianBulgarian experience.
In exchange for better living conditions in comparison to wartime conditions, job
security, health care, and pensions, Bulgarians experienced limitations to certain elements of
society and consumer indulgence. Many Bulgarians rationalized that that was the price they had
to pay for such benefits because they favored free education, health care, and welfare programs.
Thus, a culture of Nashism (or “Our People”) among ordinary Bulgarians was born to cope with
frustrations with the regime; Families developed a circle of family, friends, and close colleagues
in which they would express their discontents. The practice of establishing private vruski (ties)
would lead to families, friends, and colleagues executing uslugi (favors) for one another, both
economic and political, to overcome some of the hardships and shortages imposed by the
regime.177 Similar to the herd mentality developed during the Ottoman Occupation, Bulgarian’s
believed it was better to just keep their head down rather than outwardly critique the regime. The
risk of party expulsion, internal exile, or imprisonment was not worth the trouble for ordinary
Bulgarians. The social benefits the Zhivkov regime extended were unthinkable during the period
between the Balkan Wars and WWII due to Bulgaria’s impoverished state—making the
exchange of political and economic favors more promising than risking dissent and being faced
with political reprisals from the state. The Bulgarian narrative improved during this period; this
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improvement, however, would later induce strong sentiments of the ‘Bulgarian curse’ following
a terrible transition to democracy and explain why political nostalgia only intensified.
Nashism also arose among Bulgarian intellectuals. Observance of what the BCP was
capable of through the brutal execution of Petkov and many others under the People’s Courts, a
culture of protest never developed. Attentism, the act of playing a waiting game to keep oneself
safe, accompanied Nashism.178 The herd mentality which stalled Bulgarian prospects of earlier
liberation during the occupation influenced the high threshold of Bulgarian patience towards the
limitation of personal liberties; but, at this point in time, this seemed to be preferred over a
growing negative and hopeless narrative.
Turkish and Pomak Relations During the Communist Period
With the desire for a unified Bulgarian consciousness underlying the concept of the New
Man and a socialist Bulgarian, the stain of the Turkish yoke gained relevance once again. Efforts
to create a unified national consciousness were accompanied by USSR demands to create a new
unified “historical community – the Soviet people.”179 This historical identity was meant to
transcend national, ethnic, and religious identities; naturally, the Turkish names of Pomaks were
perceived as harmful towards a unified national consciousness and Soviet people. Name-change
campaigns captured the Marxist-Leninist idea of “proletarian internationalism”, which claimed
that the unity of the socialist state would only occur through combatting the manifestations of
bourgeoisie nationalism.180 Granting name-changing campaigns this political relevance was
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artificially nostalgic. Despite the Communist regime’s authoritarian nature not necessitating
public approval to institute policies, its framing was meant to redirect discontent towards Turks,
not Communists, in Bulgaria and disaggregate tensions towards Communist oppression due to
Communist attempts of shirking the yoke. Vigorous renaming campaigns began in villages
throughout Bulgaria in 1964. Once 80% of Pomaks had submitted to these campaigns, revolts
arose in the village of Ribnovo.181 Pomaks injured and disarmed police officers, put fezzes and
wrapped turbans around the heads of soldiers, hung a Turkish flag from the mayor’s building, cut
telephone lines and blew up the bridge connecting the only road into the village.182
Despite the uprising in Ribnovo, the BCP fervently deemed name-change campaigns
crucial for the development of the national consciousness and unity. Instead of relaxing the
forceful nature of these campaigns, the BCP passed a resolution which called for the total, mass
name changing of all Pomaks in 1970.183 Refusing a name-change was considered a traitorous
and punishable offense. Protests broke out in the town of Madan and the village of Kornitska
went on strike.184 This response led Sofia authorities to take direct action, quell the revolts, and
state that name changes were “voluntary.”185 As the violent uprisings gained notoriety and led to
the relaxing of name-change policies for a decade, the BCP would re-introduce such policies in a
radical and, some claim, a self-destructive manner shortly. While the end goal of the BCP was to
promote and create an equal society, the Pomak people were not treated through a lens that sees
past national, ethnic, and religious distinctions. Despite dissatisfaction with some aspects of
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Communist suppression, Bulgarian nationalists favored the hawkish approach the Communist
dictatorship could take, hoped to reprimand the Ottomans, and remove the Turkish yoke for
good. Nationalists perceived this as the first step towards attaining the nostalgic utopia they
romanticized, manifested politically through the regime’s aggressive policies.
The Fall of Zhivkov and the End of Communism
Two distinct policy actions of Zhivkov’s would serve as a catalyst for opposition to his
rule from both the Communist party elite and ordinary Bulgarians: the policies of Turk
“Bulgarification” and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. In 1984, Zhivkov introduced what he
termed the “Rebirth Process.”186 Zhivkov promoted the process as a “voluntary” change of
Turkish names to Bulgarian forms. The “voluntary” process, however, was one that prohibited
Turks who lacked new Bulgarian-name identity cards the ability to collect salaries and receive
salaries.187 While these campaigns were similar to Pomak name-changing operations, the Rebirth
Process came as a surprise to all because the justification of freeing individuals of injustices
committed by the Ottoman Empire was not relevant, as these individuals were natively Turkish
and had no Bulgarian ancestral connection or history of Christianity. Rather than creating a
united Soviet community, the Rebirth Process undermined the Communist system significantly.
This name-change process was the first to catch the eye of the West and was condemned by the
Helsinki Watch Report as “’one of Europe’s largest refugee flows since WWII and threatening to
annihilate Turkish culture.’”188 If Turks did not accept Bulgarian heritage willingly, the militia
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and the army was tasked to assist them with Bulgarification at the Belene labor camp—
Bulgaria’s largest military operation since WWII.189 Zhivkov shutdown Turkish newspapers,
radio broadcasts, and banned the speaking of Turkish in public. After peaceful protests resulted
in arrests, beatings, imprisonments, and the deaths of individuals in the villages of Benkovski,
Momchilgrad, Haskovo, Gorno Prakhovo, Mlechino, Razgrad, and Iablovono, Zhivkov ordered
all Pomaks and Turks who felt they would be better off in Turkey to leave Bulgaria.190 This
crippled the domestic economy almost instantly, with crops left to rot across the nations
countryside due to the exodus.191 Despite the drastic Turk exodus, party officials publicized that
the campaign was successful and “an essential barrier to the unification of the Bulgarian nation
was overcome.”192 Yet in reality, the BCP was grasping for legitimacy, on the national and
international stage. The BCPs mishandling of Chernobyl would be the last straw for the regime.
When the Chernobyl nuclear disaster erupted in April of 1986, the explosion of the
reaction was so close to Bulgaria that the nation ranked first in terms of effective radiation
exposure following the disaster.193 Radio Free Europe and BBC reported radioactive clouds over
Bulgaria but Zhivkov did not advise citizens on how to protect themselves. Instead, he secretly
imported anti-radiation drugs for party leaders.194 After denying the urgency of the situation for
over a year, poisonous gas clouds which circulated the city of Rousse sparked the first organized
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protests in Bulgaria in over 40 years of Communist rule. On September 28th, approximately 600
mothers accompanied by their children carried signs saying “‘Air for Rousse,’ ‘Life for Our
Children,’ and ‘Stop Ecological Genocide.’”195 This movement led to the creation of the first
civil environmental group in the nation, The Committee for the Environmental Protection of the
City of Rousse, and the environmental NGO, Ecoglasnost, in Sofia. For the first time,
Communist intellectuals broke with the practice of attentism and joined the Rousse Committee
and NGO—signaling outward disapproval of the Zhivkov regime. Upon banning public meetings
of Ecoglasnost in Sofia, the ordinary people’s and political elite’s resentment towards Zhivkov
intensified. The BCP could sense the growing antipathy towards Zhivkov and knew it was time
for him to leave, he was quickly nullifying progress the BCP had made towards having the
ordinary citizen view the Communist regime as a net positive.
On November 10th, 1989, Zhivkov resigned through political pressure from Petar
Mladenov, Foreign Minister and Zhivkov’s closest associate, and Dobrin Djurov, Minister of
Defense. Mladenov took his place, apologized for the abuses of the Zhivkov regime, and
suggested open elections.196 The BCP’s decision to publicly apologize for forced exodus of
Bulgarian Turks was instigated by international pressure and the realization that the Zhivkov
regime had come to an end—promoting reconciliation seemed like the only way the communists
could gain legitimacy in an electoral process on the international scale. Bulgarians stained by the
Turkish yoke, however, did not welcome these statements. By the end of the year, the BCP
agreed to host roundtable discussions regarding the country’s political structure, gave up political
monopoly, promised a multi-party democracy, and renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party
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(BSP). 50 opposition groups formed the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and agreed to send
14 groups to participate in the discussions.197 The only thing the groups comprising the UDF had
in common was the desire to transition away from communism. Aware of the disconnect and
lack of organizational capacity the UDF had, the BSP urged an early election date to maximize
their competitive edge.198 The consensus reached at the roundtable talks was the creation of a
Grand National Assembly (GNA), functioning as a regular parliament and constitutional
convention. Ultimately, the Communist preference towards early elections prevailed. As the
roundtable talks concluded at the end of January in 1990, parliamentary elections were set to
June 10th – 17th, 1990.199
Bulgaria’s Democratic Transition
Bulgaria’s First Democratic Election
Bulgaria’s end to Communism was starkly different than that of other nations in the
Soviet Bloc. Although Ecoglasnost had emerged as the first public movement against the regime,
Bulgarian citizens did not seek to overthrow the Communist regime through protests. The exit
from communism pursued by the political elite was due to discontent with Zhivkov, not with
communism. Had the elite not been so dissatisfied, the Bulgarian herd mentality could easily
have allowed for a lengthier dictatorial rule. Thus, The UDF’s campaign strategy towards the
first democratic election was retrospectively bound to fail due to the nature of the exit of
communism in Bulgaria. Campaign slogans focused on positioning members of the BSP as
murderers and mafia members who had made no changes other than changing the name of their
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party. Despite receiving $1.3m of campaign finance from the United States,200 the UDF depleted
campaign resources by over concentrating UDF supporters in major cities like Sofia, considering
the effective grassroots organizations the BSP had cemented in the rural countryside.
Contrastingly, the BSP successfully structured its campaign towards safeguarding “the
economic and social gains of socialism while overseeing a gradual transition to a market
economy.”201 Combined with the UDF’s lack of attention to the countryside, BSP leaders played
on the peasantry’s fear of a market economy transition deeply rooted in their distrust of the West.
Cognizant that the end of the regime came due to the public and elite’s dissatisfaction with
Zhivkov, not Communism directly, the BSP drew on the distinctions between the new party and
the fallen Communist leader Zhivkov, mainly the abuses of the Turkish people. The new BSP
wanted to divorce itself from the image of maltreatment, and chose reconciliation over
ultranationalism post-1989 through inviting Turks back to Bulgaria alongside the readoption of
their old names and reclaims to their property.202 While such policies led to a drop of party
membership from nationalist communists whose priority was the shirking of the yoke, the drop
in membership was far lower than that of other Soviet Bloc nations due to the protection of
agrarian workers: membership declined to 73% in 1990 but remained steady thereafter.203
In short, the BSP leaders effectively read the room while the UDF appeared seemingly
tone deaf. The BSP won 211 seats in the 1990 election, with the UDF securing 144 seats.204
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Despite being declared a free and fair election by Western observers, these results increased
Western disdain towards Bulgaria. Not only was Bulgaria “semi-European” at best, but it was
now also a nation uncommitted to a democratic transition. Bulgaria’s Western aspirations grew
weaker and the Bulgarian narrative only intensified its perception of Bulgaria as the pariah of the
EU and the Africa of Europe.205
With an organized campaign, strong organizational capabilities, and more positive
messages geared towards Bulgarian progress—as opposed to UDF campaign slogans targeting
the ethos of BSP politicians—the BSP appealed to more Bulgarians. The UDF’s grave
misinterpretation that Bulgarians of all backgrounds held a similar disdain towards the
Communists led to its partisan loss. Most importantly, however, a lack of consensus for
Bulgaria’s democratic future due to the heterogeneity within the UDF resulted in the inability to
effectively exhibit what the alternative to Communism would look like to the Bulgarian people.
The UDF struggled due to the subjectivity on which they based their political nostalgia. The
UDF could not create a unified version of Bulgaria because it amalgamated Bulgarian subgroups
nostalgic towards varying aspects of Bulgarian history. With the already present skepticism
towards democracy, the UDF did not provide a better alternative for Bulgarians who benefitted
from the extended social benefits during Zhivkov’s regime.
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Governance Following Bulgaria’s First Democratic Election
Despite the BSP’s win in the first democratic election, the next 7 years were filled with
tumultuous political transitions—with no Prime Minister elect serving a full term.206 Following
the first election, video surveillance of the new BSP President Mladenov claiming that it would
be “better if the tanks were to come”207 and end public demonstrations over Chernobyl in
December 1989 led to his resignation. On August 1st, 1990, the GNA reassembled and made its
largest compromise yet: appointing Zhelyu Zhelev of the UDF as President and Andrei Lukanov
of the BSP as Prime Minister. The UDF, however, was still unable to grasp that many
Bulgarian’s did not share the same levels of abhorrence as the UDF politicians did towards the
Communists. Zhelev continued to reject coalition with the BSP, despite the BSP’s willingness,
and made it a goal to “enter the National Assembly as an opposition that will confront the
Communist Party with its crimes, and insist it take responsibility for everything it has done under
its rule.”208 The UDF’s strategy geared towards urban areas shines through in Zhelev’s
statements, due to the constant disregard of the peasantry sentiments which propelled left-wing
parties.
The back-and-forth transitions of power between the UDF, BSP, and interim caretaker
regimes highlights the greatest issue following the dissolution of Bulgaria’s communist regime:
social cohesion. Unlike the FF’s goal of the dispersion of the New Man, new democratic parties
lacked a unifying principle. This made it easy for average Bulgarians to invest less into their
platforms, as the motivation to entrench oneself in politics was not clearly outlined. The lack of
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social consensus during Bulgaria’s transition had many negative effects: the UDF’s downfall,
corruption through the culture of Nashism and a lack of competitive ethos, and the 1996-1997
economic crisis. These events would further aggrieve the Bulgarian narrative and reinvigorate
the practice of oplakvane, ultimately coalescing into the ‘Bulgarian Curse’ and heightening
political nostalgia to a peak in the present day.
The Fall of the UDF
The UDF’s staunch opposition to anything associated with Communism led the
organization to focus on establishing a democracy like that of the United States, despite public
opinion polls predictably lacking commitment to such drastic changes. Not much had changed
since the UDF’s inception, Zhelev lacked the political authority to create cohesion among the
UDF’s heterogeneous groups, and, therefore, the party still failed to provide a clear enough
vision of the future to the public.209 Zhelev’s efforts to reprimand the Communist party led to his
dismissal towards something far more important: Bulgaria’s worsening economic conditions.
In the summer of 1990, national debt soared, economic conditions worsened, and
Bulgarians protested Zhelev’s dissatisfactory governing. A caretaker regime under Dimitar
Popov, a non-party Bulgarian judge, was appointed and Popov called for a 200-day social pact –
under which trade unions agreed to end protests and allowed economic reform to begin. At the
end of the social pact, not much had changed. In 1991, 62% of Bulgarians favored a socialdemocratic system like Sweden, while only 12.3% indicated an interest in a U.S. style
democracy.210 Despite being granted one more chance to portray a united party front once
returning to power in 1991, the UDF government made unity impossible due to their ardent
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policies seeking retribution against former Communists. The UDF government “confiscated the
property of the Communist party and related organizations such as the Communist Youth
Organization and the FF; banned top Communists from serving on governing bodies of banks
and other financial institutions; restricted pension payments for paid Communist party activists;
introduced the ‘decommunization of Science and Education’; and mandated the restitution of all
properties seized by the socialist regime since 1944.”211 The UDF’s disregard for the needs of the
Bulgarian people through economic reform and fanatic anti-Communist policies cost the party its
legitimacy. The UDF was not as in tune as it ought to have been towards the subjective nostalgia
of its followers. The UDF lost members at an increasing rate, none of its original founders were
present at the party’s fifth-year anniversary, and 39 UDF deputies refused to sign their new
constitution in 1991.212 Not only was the UDF viewed as a party divorced from reality, but its
neglect of Bulgaria’s worsening condition reinstituted the Bulgarian psyche’s perception of its
inescapable backwardness.
The drop in UDF popularity amongst Bulgarians made them reliant on tacit support of
from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), representative of Pomaks and ethnic
Turks, still scarred by the BCPs actions through renaming campaigns.213 The UDF’s focus on
retaliatory policies, however, displeased many MRF members as they felt their calls for land
restitution were not adequately addressed, responded to, and met. This led the MRF to reconsider
the BSP’s new commitment to reconciliation, and, ultimately, vote against the UDF in 1992—
pushing the UDF out of power.214 By 1992, the UDF had lost most of its outward support from
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ethnic Bulgarians and the tacit support of ethnic Turks and Pomaks which acted as it’s lifeline as
a result of its aggressive retaliatory dialogue.
Corruption Exacerbated through Nashism and a Lack of Competitive Ethos
The culture of Nashism was reestablished as the democratic governance proved it could
not provide for the Bulgarian people and private social ties seemed more reliable. Furthermore,
frequent government turnover led Bulgarian politicians to prioritize their personal gain as
opposed to the economic improvement of the nation. Instead of employment and political
appointment decisions made based on merit and qualifications, employment depended on
whether “the individuals in question were ‘ours’.”215 Politicians assumed the tumultuous
government transitions would continue and prioritized increasing their personal gain rather than
attending to the needs of the ordinary Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian narrative grew dismal
once again. Before, it was fraught with betrayal from the West, then it’s Balkan neighbors, and
now, its own people.
Exhibited mainly through the UDF’s rule, Nashism was one of the most influential
factors for the rise in some ordinary Bulgarian’s reminiscence of Communist times. When a new
government was selected, 62 positions were also up for appointment as a new party took over.216
Nashism became obvious to the ordinary Bulgarian, as politicians would appoint colleagues
unqualified for certain government position to grant each other favors with every turnover. The
dismissal of the standard of living for the ordinary citizen resonated with the yearning for mass
civilian participation and social restructuring of society present in the Bulgarian National
Liberation Movement which led to the mass adoption of Marxism in the late 19th century.
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A lack of social cohesion towards a democratic future forged a disinterest in arduous
work ethics and corruption-free modes of professional standards—two principles necessary for a
young democratic nation to thrive. The lack of a competitive ethos correlated to the job security
present during the Communist period, as promotions and success did not depend on internal
motivation but adherence to Communist orders. Independent thinking and personal initiative
resulted in negative attention from superiors and the State Security.217 Furthermore, Nashism
during the democratic transition made it easy for the proletariat to extend and receive favors
from one’s private social circle than develop a skill set for a role. The reliance on one’s intimate
circle during and after the Communist era for increased personal gain, made personal initiative
seem unnecessary. This, therefore, led to the rise of political nostalgia within varying subgroups
outside of the elite. Even though, Nashism still benefitted some members more than others
during the Communist period, the security blanket of societal welfare was present. Following the
transition, a lack of societal welfare and an increase in political favors made Bulgarians
reminiscent of the Communist period.
The Economic Crisis of 1996-1997 to Today
The preoccupation with personal gain, Communist reprimand, and dismissal of growing
economic issues soon caved in. Despite the creation of the Privatization Agency in 1992 to
implement the first law on the privatization of state-owned assets, a lack of government
dedication led to feeble progress. Between 1992 and 1997, privatization laws were amended and
experienced deletions and additions 170 times, due to the turnover of five governments.218 This
led the agency to successfully carry out only 4 privatization deals. By 1996, only 6% of state
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enterprises were privatized and 27.8% of industrial output came from the private sector.219 In
short, poor prioritization of various regimes made privatization in Bulgaria a dire failure and the
largest contribution to the economic crisis of 1996-1997—solidifying that Bulgaria’s democratic
transition attempts was a complete disaster. Bulgaria indeed was doomed. Though small bursts
of hope had occurred, the hurt on the people following such bursts was exacerbated. Between
1996 to 1997, “GDP fell by 10% in 1996 and 6% in 1997, inflation hit 123% in 1996 and 1082%
in 1997, unemployment reached 13.7% in 1997, and the value of the Bulgarian currency
depreciated sharply against the dollar.”220 While Zhivkov might have been incredibly unpopular
towards the end of his rule, no one preferred the disastrous economic conditions of 1997 to the
freedoms they gave up for significant improvements in their quality of life during the Communist
era. The Bulgarian people truly seemed cursed by backwardness.
In 1997, the Gini index of inequality increased by four points and the levels of poverty
were six times higher than 1995 levels.221 These were the worst conditions of inequality and
poverty Bulgaria ever experienced. Following 1997, poverty and inequality rates decreased
substantially. After hitting rock bottom in 1997, Bulgaria would also recover in an economic
sense. The path to recovery is not greatly significant, however, because Bulgarian sentiments
towards a prosperous democratic future were irreversibly spoiled. People’s perceptions of the
state only worsened because of the irreparable damage done to the self-critical Bulgarian psyche
through the mishandled transition, as Chapter Four will elucidate.
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The disastrous transition to a democracy developed an “imagined poor majority” and the
“Us vs Them” mentality which fueled oplakvane during the Ottoman Occupation was revived.
Individuals who felt poor, cheated, voiceless and victimized by the elites constituted the “Us”
majority.222 The hindrance of social benefits ordinary citizens received during the Communist
era and the neglect felt from a mishandled and self-centric democratic transition led regular
people to see themselves as Bulgaria’s losers. The lack of a unified vision for a Bulgarian future
and treacherous economic conditions did not offer Bulgarians hope or opportunities to prosper.
Unlike the Brigadier movement, the transition period left ordinary citizens watch the further
economic collapse of the nation from the sidelines. The rich and corrupt elites who received and
distributed favors to their social circles and grasped control of the small percentage of privatized
municipal properties for their own profit constituted the “Them.”223
Due to the small number of corrupt elites that made up the “Them” minority, regular
Bulgarians envisioned themselves as the poor losers, the “imagined poor majority.”224 Frequent
Bulgarian critiques of corruption, however, masked a more expansive critique of Bulgaria’s
transition towards a more hierarchical society through capitalism. Instead of promoting merit,
hard work, and equality, the corruption critiques further deterred the creation of a political
agenda to combat the issue—mainly because discussing corruption was a form of oplakvane that
further cemented the belief that the nation was “a hopeless morass with no way out.”225 If the
transition to democracy was seen as a beneficial move for many nations that solved the lack of
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freedoms individuals experienced under a Communist regime but Bulgaria could not seem to
implement it successfully, what hope was left? For many, there was none.
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Chapter 4: Where Do We Go From Here…if Anywhere?
After 15 years of national betrayals, frauds and criminal plundering, after the arrogant
demonstrative policy of genocide towards the Bulgarian people carried out by several
parliaments and governments under the dictation of foreign powers, at last the hour of the
Bulgarian Renaissance has come. . . .
—Volen Siderov, 2005 Addressing the Opening of the Parliament
The young and few zealots of the nation, however, made a final push to combat the
hopelessness many Bulgarians felt in the winter of 1996-97, as a result of the economic crisis.
Following the bank’s collapse, hyperinflation, and a decrease in the overall standard of living,
Bulgarian youth spearheaded daily protests in downtown Sofia for six weeks.226 Their incentive?
The corruption and imitation behind the government’s ‘progressive’ actions. The protestors were
fed up with Bulgaria’s “imitation democracy, an imitation market economy—the companies
which emerged came from the party and the secret services—and an imitation Western-oriented
foreign policy, saying the government was for Euroatlanticism while playing games with
Moscow.”227 These protests led Bulgaria to pivot and reorient it’s foreign policy around two
objectives, no matter the consequences: membership in the European Union and NATO.228
Though the nation’s first attempt to reorient with the West following the fall of the Communist
regime hurt the everyday Bulgarian, the protest catalyzed what would be considered Bulgaria’s
first real transition to competitive markets.229 The election of the UDF on May 21st, 1997—who
would be in power until July 24th, 2001—would be the first post-Communist Bulgarian
government to serve a full four-year term.230 Throughout its term, the UDF put Bulgaria on an
irrevocable path to EU membership and Western identity by: placing the armed forces under
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civilian control, securing more than half of its trade with the EU, welcoming Western investors,
publicly apologizing to Ankara for the past decade, and promising to pay the tensions of Turks
forced to leave the nation.231 Though the UDF seemed to have learned that solely retaliatory
policy was not effective, Bulgarian protests inspired by the Turkish yoke had to be quelled with
the creation of the Committee on National Reconciliation.232 Despite several nationalist protests,
the period following the UDFs election would be regarded as Bulgaria’s longest growth period
since the 1930s and the nation sported the fastest catch-up rate of any nation in Europe.233 Why
then, when a U.S. Pew Research Center study asked 38,000 interviewees from 44 countries, did
only 8% of Bulgarians say they were “content with their lot,”234 the lowest of any country in
continental Europe and the equivalent to the rate in Tanzania, Africa’s most discontented nation?
The Bulgarian People
The answer is, plainly, that the national narrative’s distraught nature had become so
entrenched within the Bulgarian people, and thus nostalgia inevitably clouded prosperity. While
nationalists were nostalgic of a homogenous Bulgaria pursued through ethnic cleansing policies,
agrarians were nostalgic of the sense of their self-importance and belonging in the economy that
had been taken away from them through the entrance of Western market players, and ordinary
citizens were nostalgic of hindered societal benefits as a result of the drastic nature of the
policies instituted to westernize Bulgaria rapidly. In accordance with the objective criteria of
social status, income and consumption, around 20% of Bulgarians have benefitted from the
transition to a market economy, yet less than 6% of the Bulgarian population are capable of
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acknowledging this improvement.235 Ivan Krastev, Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies
in Sofia, claims that this negative perception stems from the belief that it is not impossible to
succeed in the nation through honest means236—the realization that led to the proliferation of the
Bulgarian curse. In their novel Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference,
Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, renowned Harvard economists, conclude that such
unabating beliefs of poverty, [bad] luck, and a [lack of] mobility, despite their accuracy, are
correlated with each nation’s political behavior.237 Alesina and Glaeser’s analysis explains how
the perpetual corruption that followed Bulgaria’s transition can be credited not only with
aggravating the tones of negativity within the Bulgarian narrative, but also with the decrease in
voter turnout and trust in political institutions that this chapter will elicit. Most importantly,
therefore, all Bulgarians were nostalgic of the ability to entrust in their own people. For
Bulgarians, “the illusion that we will one day get better died.”238 Even though the nation had
seen its longest growth period following 1997, the pervasive narrative that this growth was not
facilitated through merit and at the expense of the imagined poor majority had become so salient
that the nation’s growth was dismissed and rarely even discussed in national media. “To put this
in a larger perspective, while the standard of living in Bulgaria is close to that of Romania,
Latvia, and Lithuania, the public levels of dissatisfaction place it next to Congo, Haiti, and Sierra
Leone.”239 To quantity the effect of this permeating narrative, Boriana Nikolova, at the time a
Graduate Student at the University of Chicago, studied how many times the word ‘poorest’ was
used to compare Bulgaria to its European counterparts from 1990-2002 in her dissertation Poor,
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Poorer, Bulgarian: Making Sense of Poverty and Inequality After the End of Communism.
Nikolova found that, at a time during which Bulgaria was the fastest growing country in Eastern
Europe, the word was used to compare Bulgaria to the EU or other European nations in 91% of
articles in Chasa, Democratzia, Trud, and Duma—the most commonly consumed newspapers in
the nation.240 Despite the progress made, the dominant narrative of backwardness persisted as a
result of the Bulgarians’ perceived unjust roots of their own growth.
While natural political nostalgia is evident through the disheartenment of the imagined
poor majority in the aforementioned public opinion polls and newspaper data, political parties
would exacerbate this dissatisfaction through the use of artificial nostalgia. As the imagined poor
majority, nationalists, and agrarians witnessed development while feeling so far removed from
them, the romanticization of Bulgarian’s past greatness and indulgence in the prior prosperity of
the homogenous Christian Bulgarian population proliferated; “by continually returning to
historical elements that had sacred resonance…political actors found the examples….upon which
to model their societies.”241 Essentially, political actors strategically utilized popular discourse
and campaigns which drew on natural nostalgia to further aggravate societal discontent, and,
therefore, amass fervor for political parties of a populist nature. Populism represents, therefore,
the manifestation of artificial political nostalgia.
The Parallels of Artificial Nostalgia and Populism
Political parties capitalizing on the public’s natural nostalgia and the bleak national
narrative encompass artificial nostalgia, as they aim to use nostalgia to accrue political capital or
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gain popular support. However, such parties need a greater catalyst to breed public discontent
with the present day to uphold the widespread adoption of their platform. The majority of the
Bulgarian population further perpetuated the negative narrative through natural nostalgia, as
shown through opinion polls and perceptions of their condition. Bulgaria’s foreign policy,
however, did not drastically alter from 2001-2005 following the UDF’s commitment to pursue
NATO and EU membership. At this time, no political parties had adopted campaigns solely
based on the faults of the present day, the people felt this way on their own. Even though
politicians knew the domestic impact such severe commitments to Westernization would result
in an increase in inequality,242 they deemed them necessary to hinder stagnation on the
international stage. Despite advancement, the Bulgarian people’s abhorrence of the UDF and
BSP, the nation’s two largest and most powerful parties, only deepened. As predicted through
the ubiquity of Nashism during both the Communist period and the early transition, only the
Bulgarian elite reaped the rewards of the realizations of Westernization. In 2004, the efforts of
the UDF and BSP had successfully led Bulgaria to achieve the thirty-one goals it had agreed
upon with Brussels in order to become a formal candidate for EU membership.243 The subjective
nature of political nostalgia, however, left many unsettled with this development. Varying
sentiments among nationalists that desired a Bulgarian-centric domestic and foreign policy,
agrarians who yearned for an egalitarian society that did not place them at the wayside for entry
of foreign corporations, and everyday citizens infuriated with prosperity centered on demerit
political favor, allowed the dangers of political nostalgia to manifest themselves through the rise
of populist parties. As I will demonstrate, populist campaigns are intrinsically reliant on artificial
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political nostalgia to flourish. Notably, I will explore The National Movement of Simeon the
Second (NMSS) in 2001, ATAKA in 2005, and There is Such a People (ITN) in 2020-21. Prior
to providing case studies of the success of these parties’ reliance on the amalgamation of
political nostalgia and the negative national narrative, let us interweave Paul Taggart’s244 account
populism from Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe into the
discussion, as the inception, popularity, and ultimate fate of NMSS, ATAKA, and ITN fall in
line with his analysis and display the artificial nostalgic nature of their platforms.
Taggert’s Populism and it’s Nostalgic Roots
In his widely acknowledged work, Taggart argues that developments in Europe have
made the region a ripe breeding ground for populist parties. I will extend this claim by asserting
that, in Bulgaria, political nostalgia created the breeding ground for populist parties, who
exclusively campaign in an artificial nostalgic manner, deepening discontent with the present.
Taggart credits sentiments of Euroscepticism—or, the criticism of the European Union and
European integration—centered on anti-elitist views seeking greater representation and less
cultural integration as proponents crucial to the flourishing of populist parties.245 Interestingly
enough, the varying forms of natural political nostalgia among the Bulgarian people exhibit all
these sentiments, as seen through the imagined poor majority attestation of the elite, Bulgarian
nationalists sentiments towards Turks and Pomaks, and agrarian perceptions of Eurocentric
capitalists. Taggart attributes four themes that populist parties share that grant them the power to
attract these individuals and manifest a subjective model homeland—or ‘heartland’ as Taggart
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names it—through the use of artificial political nostalgia to attract already nostalgic and fervent
citizens. The four themes are as follows: hostility towards representative politics, identification
with an idealized heartland, deficiency of core values, and emergence as a reaction to an extreme
crisis.246 These themes, in the Bulgarian context, all accentuate dissatisfactions with the present.
The rise of populist parties, therefore, evinces the threat to freedom and of irreversible stagnation
the pursuit of a utopian, prescriptive, and subjective society through political nostalgia Chapter
One warned of. Furthermore, the adoption of artificial nostalgia makes political nostalgia
regenerative, as populist parties draw on already present nostalgia, deepen discontent, and
ultimately, promote more widespread nostalgia as societal discontent becomes a more present
theme in public discourse.
I will articulate a brief overview of Taggert’s themes for the purpose of connecting each
respective parties’ platform to its populist nature, and, further, demonstrating how the presence
of political nostalgia underlies each of these themes. Populist parties are averse to representative
party platforms centered on securing rights for individuals of minority groups and seeking
redress for injustices.247 Instead, populist parties gain traction through extreme charismatic
leadership which appeals to certain groups or beliefs present in the nation.248 In short, populist
parties do not seek an equitable government, but one that is simply ‘better’ for their members.
The subjective nature of nostalgia, therefore, is critical for this criteria. If Bulgaria’s political
nostalgia reminisced on the same historical moments, a platform supporting a better society for a
segment of the population would not stand.
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Taggart’s second premise relies on the various subjective ideal realities that nostalgia
breeds: populists represent a ‘heartland’ that is a ‘past-derived vision projected onto the present’
that relies on feeling, not reason.249 This premise highlights the danger of utilizing political
nostalgia as a means to achieve an ideal society, because distinct political nostalgias develop
equally distinct, and often competing, utopias, rendering their execution unfeasible. This premise
even mirrors Berdahl’s claim that ostalgie posits a ‘once was’ relation to a ‘now.’ Appealing to
the retrospective and perspective nature of political nostalgia, this condition only advances the
creation of competing ideal societies through populist politics—as individuals with differing
experiences are prospective and retrospective in divergent manners.
Compounding with this principle is the idea that populism lacks core values.250 Populists
can be revolutionary, reactionary, left-wing, right-wing, authoritarian, or libertarian251; they do,
however, have one commonality: populists react against current standards, they do not act for
espoused values. Populists, therefore, show a dissatisfaction with the present as a driving force
within their platform—the precondition for any form of political nostalgia.
Ultimately, populists not only react, but they react in a crisis, utilizing artificial political
nostalgia as a tool to inject urgency and importance into their platform.252 This concluding theme
exhibits the danger of political nostalgia in stagnating society and anchors Bulgarian populism
on artificial nostalgia: the urgency of populist platforms further incepts dissatisfaction and
provides individuals hope that the subjective utopian society they have conjured has the potential
to awaken, rendering populists more fanatical than the typical political party member. Taggart
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concludes, however, by arguing that while these populist parties gain traction quickly, the
foundation of their origin makes it difficult for populists to sustain momentum, ensuring their
inevitable dwindling.253 As I will explore, such is the case with the NMSS and ATAKA.
Whether this will occur with the ITN is currently unknown, though clearly prescriptible. The rise
and fall of populist parties, however, makes nostalgia perpetual, as its successes makes
individuals believe their utopia is desirable but their fall makes individuals more dissatisfied with
the present.
National Movement of Simeon the Second (NMSS)
Despite the effects of the UDF’s Eurocentric policies which sparked Bulgaria’s longest
growth period in 70 years, the Bulgarian population’s dissatisfaction with the elite’s exclusive
procurement of the benefits from Western investors propelled the NMSS—and notably, it’s
leader Simeon Saxecoburgotski—to power. Saxecoburgotski was the grandson of Tsar Ferdinand
and son of Boris III254—he served as the last Tsar of Bulgaria from 1943-1946, though he was
never crowned as he was only six years old in 1943, prior to the entire family’s exile by the
Soviet army in 1946.255 Saxecoburgotski was aware of the frustration with the corrupt practices
rooted in Nashism that fueled public anger towards the UDF and the BSP, and upon his return to
Bulgaria in 2001, he declared his intention to follow in his family’s footsteps and run for office.
As a result, Saxecoburgotski organized the NMSS in April of 2001, two months prior to the
upcoming elections.256 Saxecoburgotski appealed to the Bulgarians nostalgic of the greatness the
nation reached under royal leadership during the Bulgarian empires and the politicians marred by
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the corruption present in post-communist politics as he was so far removed from the transition.
Saxecoburgotski quite literally personified political nostalgia, his entire campaign grounded on a
glorified past his last name represented. The root of Saxecoburgotski’s name and the importance
it holds speaks volumes to the presence of political nostalgia in Bulgaria. Primarily, the House of
Saxe-Coburg and Gotha holds significance to Bulgaria’s history with royal rule under Tsar
Ferdinand and Boris III. Despite contentious opinions of Ferdinand, the nationalist policies he
pursued and his commitment to restoring lost Bulgarian lands in the Balkan Wars made
nationalist Bulgarians nostalgic of such Bulgarian-centric domestic and foreign policy. Boris
III’s commitment to neutrality and protecting the Bulgarian people during WWI and WWII, on
the other hand, made Bulgarian’s reminiscent of a leader who they felt had their best interest at
heart. The most important aspect of political nostalgia Saxecoburgotski drew on, however, was
that Bulgarians felt a presently unattainable pride, trust, and prosperity when reflecting on
Bulgarian Tsardom as a result of the First and Second Bulgarian Empire. Saxecoburgotski was
not merely a politician with a royal lineage, his lineage was his politics. Saxecoburgotski was not
a skilled politician, but simply the real-life incarnation of a hope in a glorified past.
Saxecoburgotski, aware of the power his name holds, artificially disseminated public
discontent to accrue political capital. The NMSS’s name itself reflected the use of artificial
nostalgia. Including Saxecoburgotski’s name in the party title capitalized on Bulgarian
romanticization of prosperity during the First and Second Bulgarian Empires, dissatisfaction of
the present, and hope that, because Saxecoburgotski was a tsar, he could be their savior. Prior to
the election, Saxecoburgotski notably attended Easter celebrations at which he “publicly recited
the Orthodox Creed and subsequently attended religious ceremonies at the time of the electoral
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campaign advocating his political ambitions.”257 Such actions strategically glorified the
Christian-Bulgarians who retreated to the hills during the Ottoman Empire to preserve the nation,
artificially growing discontent that such a strong and homogenous population was no longer
present. The NMSS appealed to Bulgarians subjectively nostalgic of the ethno-homogenous and
ethno-cultural Bulgarian Empire, dissatisfied both with the present corruption and the lack of
freedom during Communist times, notably the outlawing of religious worship. Their subjective
nostalgia would differ from Bulgarians nostalgic of leftist policies, and the NMSS embraced
their selective utopian ideals. Furthermore, the NMSS had a short, yet powerful campaign
slogan: “Trust me.”258 Even their campaign slogan artificially bred nostalgia through discontent.
The NMSS imposed the belief that the current government should not be trusted, validating
already-present skepticism of corruption in public opinion polls. As the NMSS contrived
heightened dissatisfaction towards the present political environment, the NMSS also gave life to
the nostalgic belief that there must have been a society better than the current. In her article “Left
Wing, Right Wing, Everything: Xenophobia, Neo-totalitarianism, and Populist Politics in
Bulgaria,” Kristen Ghodsee articulates Saxecoburgotski’s emulation of Taggart’s populism
which I will fill in with my concept of political nostalgia. Ghodsee claims that “According to
Paul Taggart’s definition, populist movements capitalize on popular frustration at the corruption
and self-interestedness of those who dominate representative politics. Simeon Saxecoburgotski
(Simeon II) Populists also appeal to the idea of a fixed national identity that unites the populace
that the political elite should serve.”259 However, had political nostalgia of Tsardom and ethnic
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homogeneity not been readily available for further manipulation, the NMSS would have gained
no traction. The NMSS’s populist nature would be nothing without political nostalgia and the
artificial nostalgia it espoused.
The NMSS relied on a charismatic leader, constructed a heartland for the Bulgarians
already nostalgic of a homogenous Christian utopia, lacked core values, and reacted to the crisis
of distrust within the nation. As a result, the NMSS appealed to nostalgic nationalists reminiscent
of a glorified past and nostalgic citizens frustrated with the present, thus granting the party an
outlet under which to further propagate discontent through artificial political nostalgia in their
campaign. Unsurprisingly The NMSS was incredibly successful. Despite mobilizing only two
months prior to the 2001 elections, the party took 120 seats, 42.74% of the national vote, in the
parliamentary elections, placing both main political parties, the UDF and BSP, on the opposition
through creating a coalition government with the MRF.260 Despite initial hope in the NMSS’s
capabilities, the Bulgarian curse could not be escaped.
Although preaching honesty, the NMSS succumbed to the permeating culture of
Nashism. As aforementioned, towards the end of the NMSS’s reign, Saxecoburgotski
successfully led Bulgaria to close all thirty-one conditions it had agreed upon with Brussels to
qualify the nation for EU membership.261 Yet, this perceived success did not please the Bulgarian
people. Even though the NMSS continued Bulgaria’s growth period initiated by the UDF,
Saxecoburgotski restituted former lands to himself, allowed cabinet members to bleed the state
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coffer through privatization schemes, and manipulated foreign debt.262 The Bulgarian public’s
frustration with the corrupt nature of NMSS’s was justified, though historical accounts of party
negligence towards commitments of sincerity prove this foreseeable. The 2005 parliamentary
elections, therefore, would see the rise of ATAKA as a response to the snowballing corruption
crisis while recording decreased voter turnout as hopelessness further eroded the Bulgarian
national narrative.
ATAKA
Bulgarian populist parties may follow a similar theme, as ATAKA also materialized just
two months prior to the 2005 elections.263 The name of the party itself enshrines the use of
artificial nostalgia to heighten discontent and substantiate a populist platform, as it is the
Bulgarian word for ‘Attack’ and stands for “ATAKA for” and “ATAKA against.”264 ATAKA’s
title capitalizes on the frustrations and nostalgic desires of varying social groups within Bulgaria;
similar to the NMSS, it bridges nationalists, with displeased members of the imagined poor
majority, but also attracts workers resentful of Western corporate influence. The party ‘is for’
“pulling Bulgarian forces out of Iraq, revising corrupt privatization deals, and making sure that
the Bulgarian economy served the interests of the Bulgarian people; [While the party is] ‘against’
anti-Bulgarianness in the government, foreign military bases in Bulgaria, the selling of land to
foreigners, and ethnic parties and separatist organizations.265 Despite the presence of the Turkish
yoke in the Bulgarian narrative, the party’s name furthers and validates anger based on said
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yoke. To act on its promises, on Independence Day prior to the 2005 elections, the party held
political rallies that petitioned to silence calls for prayer from mosques across Bulgaria.266 The
strength of these rallies intensified anti-Turk sentiment, artificially breeding more discontent
with growing acceptance of Turkish relevance through the NMSS’s prior coalition government
with the MRF. From the outset, ATAKA emerges as an alt-right nationalist party harnessing
ethnic and religious intolerance alongside anti-corruption to build its following. Had nationalists
not been nostalgic of past renaming campaigns, had agrarians not felt nostalgia of their sense of
belonging during Communist times and the past respect of the Bulgarian peasantry, and had
ordinary Bulgarians not been nostalgic of the prosperity Bulgaria during the Second Empire, the
populist principles of hostility towards representative politics, a heartland for a specific identity,
and inception as a response to crisis would not have garnered attention in Bulgaria. Ghodsee
notes that a ATAKA is a true populist party because it is capable of promoting ideas that
“originate on opposite ends of the political spectrum,”267 through intertwining far-right
nationalism with a far-left political agenda. ATAKA can do this, however, because it’s far-left
and far-right platform appeals to the plethora of subjective utopias developed through political
nostalgia. Once again, while ATAKA manifests artificial nostalgia, it would not have
experienced as steep a rise in popularity without reliance on already-present political nostalgia.
ATAKA’s leader—Volen Siderov—widespread critiques of the Eurocentric nature of the
UDF, among other parties, exhibit artificial nostalgia as he furthers discontent of Westernization
policies that isolate workers, notably farmers, who tied their sense of identity to the importance
of their work during the communist period. Siderov’s critiques furthered this discontent and
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nostalgia through his validation of Westernization’s injustices. Through authoring five novels
that intertwine Bulgarian nationalism with left-leaning policies, namely Bulgarophobia and
Boomerang of Evil, Siderov also gained credibility as a leader with committed and distinct
views. ATAKA’s notable leftist tendencies include promoting legislation for the re-examination
of privatization and re-nationalization of state-owned companies owned by foreign investors,
critiquing alignment with the World Bank and the IMF, disagreeing with policies that cut state
funding for healthcare, education, and promulgating pension plans to service foreign debt.268 As
aforementioned, a common agrarian critique post-1989 was that the transition to privatization
and capitalization left the Bulgarian farmers to the wayside, with no resources to acclimate,
while welcoming foreign companies to displace them. While agrarians formed a socialist
political nostalgia that drew them into ATAKA’s platform, far-right nationalists reminiscent of
Bulgarian greatness imagined an alternate utopian reality. ATAKA’s platform artificially
escalated both of these dissatisfactions. ATAKA is uniquely powerful, therefore, because it
represents a right-wing nationalist party while “promoting a Russian version of left leaning,
nationalist neo-authoritarianism justified by the people’s inability to defend themselves against
corrupt political elites and oligarchs.”269 ATAKA artificially generated a new constituency
previously ignored by incumbent parties. This dichotomy, however, fulfills the remaining
untouched theme of populism—a lack of core values—as the party only based itself on
characteristics of nostalgia. ATAKA’s far-right and far-left constituents are politically nostalgic
regarding incompatible aspects of Bulgaria’s history, calling varying subjective utopias. The
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subjective nature of these conflicting utopian nostalgias, therefore, substantiate that ATAKA’s
populism lacks a core value.
While the 2005 Parliamentary Elections were notable in their own right as they exhibited
the lowest voter turnout in Bulgaria’s post-communist history likely due to the rise in
hopelessness felt by citizens from the betrayal by the NMSS, national and international attention
was on ATAKA’s success. In 2005, ATAKA won 8% of the vote and 21 seats in the National
Assembly, beating all moderate center-right parties. ATAKA was the first party with an openly
nationalist platform to gain representation in Bulgaria following 1989. Becoming the fourthlargest party in parliament was surely a featm, considering the party’s controversial policies and
inception only two months prior to elections. A feat driven by political nostalgia and a negative
national narrative, that is.
In accordance with Taggart’s prediction, however, ATAKA would not maintain enough
momentum to sustain itself for long in Bulgaria’s political landscape. Yet, Taggart’s claim would
not be valid if political nostalgia had not led to the creation of the diverse utopias the party aimed
to address. In addition to the difficulty in sustaining ATAKA’s constituency due to the multitude
of conflicting utopias the party aimed to coalesce, the party’s radical actions steadily affected its
legitimacy. Following 2005, the outlook and performance of the party grew bleak. In 2006,
Siderov was stripped of his parliamentary voting immunity due to his discriminatory remarks
gaining international recognition, and, in 2007, the party lost regard after its deputies were
labeled as showing an intentional lack of respect for political correctness. The party’s popularity
fluctuated but still declined over time, gaining 8.14%, 9.44%, 7.30%, 4.52%, 9.07%, and 0.49%
of the vote in 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2021, respectively. The party, incapable of
securing a single seat in the 2021 elections, hasfaded away from the spotlight of Bulgarian
91

political discourse. Despite the inability to gain significant influence in politics, ATAKA still
demonstrated how a party can notice the presence of various political nostalgias, capitalize on
the discontents which breed the separate nostalgias, and create a populist agenda that artificially
exacerbates the discontents initially present in society.
Ever since Bulgaria’s Parliamentary elections in 2007, the center-right Citizens for
European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) have been in power.270 GERB’s Boiko Borisov has
served as prime minister since. This stability in party leadership, however, does not mean the
nation has developed a healthy political system that has ameliorated the dissatisfaction that
further propagates political nostalgia. In fact, nostalgic tendencies and the worsening of the
Bulgarian narrative have only intensified. As I will discuss briefly, Bulgaria’s 2021
Parliamentary Elections point to this, as the newly formed anti-establishment There Is Such a
People (ITN) political party shows the imminent rise of yet another populist party which
garnered enough support to become the second largest in Parliament through an artificially
nostalgic platform. How could this occur? As seen with NMSS and ATAKA, political nostalgia
arising from differing societal discontents culminated into a growing crisis of distrust and
faithlessness of fellow Bulgarians. This granted ITN the catalyst it needed to intensify an
already-present hope for a utopian society through artificial nostalgia.
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Bulgaria, Today
Bulgaria is tied with Romania and Hungary on Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index, marking the three nations the worst-ranking EU members.271 The World Press
Freedom Index ranks Bulgaria 112th out of 180 countries, describing Bulgaria as “the Black
Sheep of the European Union” due to its corruption and collusion between media, politicians,
and oligarchs.272 The actions of Borisov, and GERB in general, have driven the upshot in
corruption. In addition to being under investigation by Spanish prosecutors over money
laundering273, Borisov’s frequent boasting of photos in which he visits the nation’s schools and
churches in his Jeep274 coupled with public knowledge that such infrastructure was negotiated
through tenders which benefit the associates and friends of GERB have made many Bulgarian’s
seek change. The Parliamentary Election held on April 4th, 2021, and, most importantly, the
success of the ITN party, exhibits how public dissatisfaction and the presence of political
nostalgia was necessary for a populist party to gain traction.
There is Such a People (ITN)
Sentiments of Bulgarian youth describe the political climate GERB has further inoculated
as one that is "worn-out, illegitimate and harmful for political and public life in Bulgaria”275 in
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which "nepotism and corruption are also omnipresent.”276 The sentiments of imagined poor
majority have only entrenched dissatisfaction into the national narrative more, fueling more
political nostalgia. The 2020 elections saw three anti-establishment parties gain electoral seats,
the ITN, Democratic Bulgaria (DB), and Stand Up! Thugs Out!, but the leadership and origin of
ITN specifically and aptly depicts political nostalgia, both natural and artificial, and it’s required
presence for populism to thrive.
Slavi Trifonov, who would found and serve as the leader of the ITN, is a Bulgarian
producer, singer, actor, and host of one of Bulgaria’s most famous evening talk show hosts,
Slavi’s Show.277As a producer and talk show host, Trifonov used political satire to criticize
Eurocentric politicians and irritate the status quo through mimicking Bulgarian politicians while
also inviting Borisov and Rumen Radev, Bulgaria’s current president, among others, onto his
show.278 He’s controversially referred to ministers as gay, jail mates,279 and, most notably,
executed a satirical skit which depicted Nadezhda Mihaylova, Bulgarian prime minister of
Foreign Relations during the UDFs reign from 1997-2001, as a woman who “танцува с кол”280
(dances on a pole), insinuating she utilizes her looks to achieve political goals. Trifonov often
criticized Mihaylova her Eurocentric policies, as she is often credited for her contributions to
Bulgaria’s integration into NATO and the EU. The discourse of Trifonov’s show has artificially
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intensified the discontent of Bulgarian’s seeking a more nationalist domestic and foreign policy,
reminiscent of the Bulgarian Empires and dissatisfied with the West’s negligence of the
Bulgarian people. His music released through the band Slavi Trifonov and the Ku-Ku Band—
whose name colloquially means ‘cuckoo’ in Bulgarian and alludes to the “craziness [and]
silliness…arguably characteristic of the life and experiences of the early years of postsocialist
transition281—falls under chalga (Turkish for ‘musical instrument’).282 Chalga music distinctly
“embodies both the negative attitudes of Bulgarian society towards its Ottoman heritage as well
as its fractured and traumatic social experiences with the post socialist transition.”283 While
drawing on those individuals nostalgic of an ethnically and culturally homogenous Bulgaria and
the renaming campaigns throughout the Balkan Wars and the Communist regime, Trifonov also
appeals to those unhappy with the corruption within the Bulgarian government in the present
day. Lyrics in the group’s song ““Nqma Takava Dŭrzhava” (“There Ain’t a Country Like This”)
reflect nostalgic tones yearn for a better status quo and question why a better society is not being
pursued, through asking rhetorical questions like: “Are you sleeping?”; “How many times are
you going to relive the same old story?”;“How long are you going to live in this lie?”284 Clearly,
Trifonov’s personality appeals to various facets of political nostalgia and discontent present in
the Bulgarian society: that of the working class displaced by the West, that of Bulgarian
nationalists, and that of the imagined poor majority who feel abused by the elite. Despite
controversial opinions regarding Trifonov, his career and social commentary is intimately tied to
Bulgaria’s experience post-1989, as his participation in satirical television programs dates back
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to 1990.285 Trifonov has been considered either a socially conscious voice of the people or
boorish TV personality for decades due to his political critiques.
When social unrest over corruption, similar to those of 1996 which instigated to the
1996-1997 Sofia protests, resulted in demonstrations to prevent Borisov and GERB from
winning a fourth term in the summer of 2020, Trifonov capitalized on his political stance.286
Trifonov’s charismatic nature coupled with increased anti-elite sentiments led him to find There
Is Such a People (ITN), whose name was inspired by his album ““Ima Takav Narod” (‘There is
such a Nation’).287 The party’s anti-elitist and anti-corruption focus are the precipice of its
platform, while also purporting light forms of direct democracy.288 ITN’s aggressive goal to curb
Bulgaria’s omnipresent corruption resonates with what initially drew intrigue to both the NMSS
and ATAKA.
Results of the April 4th Election
The April 4th election resulted in a fragmented parliament with no clear winner. GERB’s
loss of grip on power can be credited to the rise of the populist ITN and anti-corruption
campaigns. This is the first time since 2005 that ATAKA will not be in parliament, as
aforementioned. Furthermore, the ITN succeeded in pushing the BSP out of second place,
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becoming the main opposition to GERB. The BSP has not suffered such a loss in support in
Bulgaria’s post-communist history.289
Figure 3: Results of the 2021 Parliamentary Election. Source: Central Electoral Commission

As a result of this fragmentation, President Rumen Radev handed GERB a mandate to
form a coalition government.290 After GERB was incapable of gaining consensus to form a
government and returned to mandate to Radev on the 23rd, the mandate was passed to Trifonov
and ITN. However, Trifonov decided to stay firm to the party’s platform and refused to “accept
support from the traditional parties it blames for keeping Bulgaria as the European Union's
poorest and most corrupt member state”291—returning the mandate to Radev on the 27th.
Through this action, Trifonov shows awareness of rising discontent with the corrupt and elite
nature of established party the artificially nostalgic nature of the ITN’s platform intensified—
while granting his followers hope their various utopias will be pursued through showing that
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there is hope for a better future and he will not succumb to corruption. At this very moment,
Radev can grant the BSP the mandate in hopes of forming a coalition government, but GERB
and ITN’s failure in structuring a coalition government insinuates this is likely not plausible. A
third failure necessitates the creation of an interim government and the call for new elections
within two months.292
What Now?
In Bulgaria, the mixture of both natural and artificial nostalgia has reached the threat
level discussed in Chapter One; Bulgarian political nostalgia serves as both a massive barrier to
future development and a sign of perpetual stagnation for years to come. The stalemate of this
most election and its effects on Bulgarian society helped to fully elucidate this threat. Bulgaria
has yet to create a COVID-19 recovery plan using the €12.3 billion the country has been
allocated from the European Recovery Fund293 or to develop a strategy for its allocation of €16.7
billion from the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework.294 If the stalemate continues, a
coalition government is not established, and a new parliament does not revise and pass plans for
these funds, Bulgaria will lose access to the much-needed stimulus.295 The loss of these funds
would negatively affect almost every Bulgarian citizen. Not only would populist parties fail in
their nostalgia-based promises made to individuals who fit their homeland, but also widespread
discontent would, justifiably, run rampant across all aspects of society. The belief in the
Bulgarian curse would seem justified, and thus negativity present in the national narrative will
continue to snowball out of control. And, ultimately, a further worsening of the national narrative
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will only spur more dissatisfaction with the status quo, consistently placing the various political
nostalgias and their conflicting utopias at the front of political agendas. The overall wellbeing
and development of Bulgaria’s general population, therefore, will remain inferior. Considering
that the recent reports have shown six out of ten Bulgarian households are unable to meet levels
of subsistence,296 this threat is incredibly frightening.
Bulgaria now suffers from a severe fragmentation of the political system. This
fragmentation poses a threat of even more dissatisfaction among the public. Increased
dissatisfaction, as this thesis has hoped to prove, creates a negative feedback loop against
development that will be nearly impossible to escape. Varying social groups will spurn political
nostalgia reminiscent of even more aspects of Bulgaria’s history. Such political nostalgia will
generate more subjective utopias, granting politicians more narratives to exploit through populist
politics. The nation’s narrative has entrenched itself in the culture and cyclical nature of political
nostalgia, putting Bulgarians in a political cage of their own making. A falsified perception of
past greatness will keep modern day Bulgaria from ever achieving any real progress.
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